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Introduction
Public school officials claim that they have the duty, often imposed
by statute, to educate and to inculcate students so that they learn specific
subject matter, acquire life-long learning skills, and become committed to
the fundamental societal values necessary for the exercise of the rights
and obligations of citizenship.' Advocates of an expansive view of the
1. J. SAYLOR & W. ALEXANDER, CURRICULUM PLANNING FOR MODERN SCHOOLS
126-27 (1966) lists the functions of public elementary and secondary schools in the United
States. Several of these functions relate to the intellectual and emotional growth of the child:
"[d]etermination of individual talents, capacities, and abilities; . . . [d]evelopment of individ-
ual potentialities; . . .[t]ransmission of the cultural heritage; . . .[d]iscovery and systemiza-
tion of knowledge; [and] [d]evelopment of character." Id. (emphasis omitted). Another
function is the "[i]nculcation of values, beliefs, and ideals of the social group," which is defined
as "provid[ing] educational experiences that give pupils an understanding of the values, mores,
and traditions of society, and that will ensure adherence to these values in behavior." Id. at
127 (emphasis omitted). This Article uses the term "value inculcation" in this sense. The final
function described by the authors, "[p]reparation [of children] for adulthood," implicitly in-
volves value inculcation. This preparation consists of "provid[ing] learning experiences that
will enable the individual when he assumes an adult role in the society to be economically self-
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First Amendment contend that public school officials exceed their consti-
tutional authority through curricular and instructional decisions that in-
culcate young people to accept only those ideas and beliefs approved by
others.2 The central issue represented in these competing viewpoints fo-
cuses on the applicability of First Amendment3 freedoms to students in
public elementary and secondary schools.
This Article attempts to reconcile the inculcative function served by
public education with First Amendment limitations on governmental au-
thority. Section I examines United States Supreme Court decisions that
discuss these competing constitutional values. The following section dis-
cusses the unique status of public school students as minors in a captive
audience. The Article then extensively analyzes the 1982 Supreme Court
decision, Board of Education v. Pico.4 The final section proposes a model
of analysis to use in resolving issues concerning First Amendment rights
of students in the public school classroom.
supportive, socially dependable, politically insightful, and morally self-directive." Id. (empha-
sis omitted). See also J. CONANT, THE CHILD, THE PARENT, AND THE STATE 76-77 (1959);
L. TAYLOR, D. MCMAHILL & B. TAYLOR, THE AMERICAN SECONDARY SCHOOL 4-7 (1960);
Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention,
59 TEx. L. REv. 477, 497-500 (1981); Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public
School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1343, 1350-54
(1976); Orleans, What Johnny Can't Read: "First Amendment Rights" in the Classroom, 10 J.
L. & EDUC. 1, 5-9 (1981).
2. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 623-26 (1970);
Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 522, 526-28 (1960);
Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841, 856-
57; Comment, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum Material: Rights of Students
and Parents, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485, 492-503 (1979). See generally N. DORSEN, P.
BENDER & B. NEUBOURNE, 1 EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 879-90 (4th ed. 1976) (citing numerous cases involving rights of
students).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This Article limits its discussion to Supreme Court
decisions that interpret the First Amendment. While numerous lower federal and state courts
have decided cases involving the rights of children in public school classrooms, a comprehen-
sive discussion of the divergent approaches and conclusions is impractical in an article of this
scope. Furthermore, this Article analyzes the applicability of First Amendment freedoms to
students in public school classrooms in the context of Supreme Court decisions. It does not
discuss alternative approaches unlikely to be adopted by the Supreme Court.
4. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
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I. The Function of the Public School Classroom: Value
Inculcation or Marketplace of Ideas?
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court have long recognized
that a primary function of public elementary and secondary education is
to inculcate young people with the fundamental values of our democratic
society.5 Other opinions of the Court suggest that the public school
classroom serves as a marketplace of ideas.6 This section examines the
apparent inconsistency by analyzing several lines of Supreme Court
cases. A careful study of these cases reveals that the Supreme Court has
never held that the public school classroom is a marketplace of ideas,
even though occasional suggestions to the contrary have appeared in
dicta.
A. The Function of Value Inculcation in Public Elementary and
Secondary Schools
Courts in the United States consistently have recognized the impor-
tance of the inculcative function of public education, particularly at the
elementary and secondary levels. One of the earliest Supreme Court
cases to discuss the authority of the state to regulate schools, Meyer v.
Nebraska,7 held that "the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in
order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and mor-
ally."' 8 Similarly, Pierce v. Society of Sisters9 recognized that states may
require "that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the
public welfare."'" Although these early cases were decided during the
now discredited Lochner v. New York' I substantive due process era, more
recent cases also recognize the importance of value inculcation in our
system of public education.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 7-20.
6. The expression "marketplace of ideas" is derived from Justice Holmes' view of the
First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), Justice Holmes stated:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market ....
Id. at 630.
7. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
8. 262 U.S. at 401.
9. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See infra text accompanying notes 31-38.
10. 268 U.S. at 534.
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See infra notes 24-25.
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In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education,'2 the Supreme
Court noted the relationship between public education and our demo-
cratic form of government:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recogni-
tion of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibili-
ties . . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him
to adjust normally to his environment. 3
Because public education plays a critical role in educating the na-
tion's youth, and teachers serve an important function in the process, the
Supreme Court in Ambach v. Norwick14 upheld a state statute' 5 that pro-
hibited non-United States citizens from teaching in New York public
schools. The Court expressly recognized the vital role played by public
schools in "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system."' 6 Emphasizing the part that teachers
play in this process, the Court noted the teachers' "opportunity to influ-
ence the attitudes of students toward government, the political process,
and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the con-
tinued good health of a democracy."' 7 The Court rejected the argument
that the restriction of an alien's freedom to teach in public schools is
"contrary to principles of diversity of thought and academic freedom em-
bodied in the First Amendment,"'" and stated that "the attempt to draw
an analogy between choice of citizenship and political expression or free-
dom of association is wide of the mark, as the argument would bar any
effort by the State to promote particular values and attitudes toward gov-
ernment."' 9 The Court recognized not only the authority but also the
duty of public schools to prepare the youth of America for participation
in the democratic process. The Court adamantly refused to hinder state
efforts to accomplish this goal.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown held that racially segregated schools violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. In his opin-
ion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren cited numerous sociological studies that examined the
effect of racial segregation on black school children. 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11.
13. 347 U.S. at 493.
14. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
15. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001(3) (McKinney 1981).
16. 441 U.S. at 77.
17. Id. at 79.
18. Id. at 79 n.10.
19. Id.
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The most recent and the most significant Supreme Court decision to
affirm the power of state and school officials to inculcate public elemen-
tary and secondary school students with the basic values of our society
was the 1982 case of Board of Education v. Pico.20 Pico strongly reaffirms
the appropriateness, the importance, and the constitutionality of the in-
culcative function of public education.
B. Early Substantive Due Process Cases
Two cases decided by the Court in the 1920's suggest that students
possess First Amendment rights in the public school classroom. 21
Neither case, however, furnishes significant authority for this
proposition.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,22 the Supreme Court invalidated a Nebraska
law,23 as applied to nonpublic schools, that prohibited instruction in any
language other than English prior to the ninth grade. Far from recogniz-
ing the existence of First Amendment rights of students, the case actually
was decided on substantive due process grounds. 24 The analysis of the
Court in Meyer invoked the approach enunciated earlier in Lochner v.
20. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
21. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
22. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
23. Teaching Foreign Languages in Schools Act, ch. 249, 1919 Neb. Laws 1019, provided
in pertinent part:
Section 1 .... No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private,
denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any
language other than the English language.
Section 2. . . . Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as
languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth
grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent
of the county in which the child resides.
Section 3. . . . Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
24. By 1923 when Meyer was decided, the Supreme Court had not yet begun selectively
incorporating various provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, and
thereby extending its prohibitions to state as well as to federal action. See, e.g., Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), is generally re-
garded as the first case that applied the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the
states. Prior to the incorporation of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the Four-
teenth Amendment, courts typically determined whether the challenged state action violated
fundamental freedoms included within the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in part: "No State shall
• . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " Sub-
stantive due process analysis began with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) and was
soon extended to a wide range of property and economic rights. See, e.g., Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This "economic rights prong" of substantive due process has suf-
fered a precipitous decline since the time of the Lochner decision. See, e.g., Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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New York,25 perhaps the most notorious of the early substantive due pro-
cess cases. According to Meyer, the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment included "the right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, . . . and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men."26
Using this mode of analysis, the Court held that the teacher in-
volved "taught this [German] language . ..as part of his occupation.
His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to in-
struct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment."27 Only passing references were made to "the opportuni-
ties of pupils to acquire knowledge"28 and "the power of parents to con-
trol the education of their own."29 The Court focused not on rights of
free expression but rather on the state's interference "with the calling of
modem language teachers." The economic and contract rights of the
teachers in private schools, not the personal free speech rights of students
in public schools, led the Court to strike down the application of the
statute to nonpublic schools.
Similarly, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters"t struck down an
Oregon statute32 that required, with only a few exceptions, all children
between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public schools. In effect,
the statute prohibited the fulfillment of the state's compulsory education
requirement 33 at any nonpublic school. Writing for the Court, Justice
25. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Often considered the high-water mark of substantive due process,
Lochner held that legislation regulating working hours of adult males violated liberty of con-
tract as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
26. 262 U.S. at 399 (citing Lochner and various other liberty of contract/substantive due
process cases).
27. Id. at 400.
28. Id. at 401.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
32. Act of Nov. 7, 1922, ch. 1, 1923 Or. Laws 9 (codified as amended at OR. RE,. STAT.
§§ 339.10-339.30 (1977)), provided in pertinent part:
Children between the Ages of Eight and Sixteen Years-Any parent, guardian or
other person in the state of Oregon, having control or charge or custody of a child
under the age of sixteen years and of the age of eight years or over at the commence-
ment of a term of public school of the district in which said child resides, who shall
fail or neglect or refuse to send such child to a public school for the period of time a
public school shall be held during the current year in said district, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and each day's failure to send such child to a public school shall consti-
tute a separate offense. ...
33. At present, compulsory education laws exist in all 50 states. These laws vary as to the
maximum age at which a child must start school and the minimum age when a child can
withdraw from school. In most states, however, children must attend school from ages 7 to
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McReynolds, who also wrote the Meyer opinion, ignored any rights stu-
dents may have possessed. He focused on the right of parents to raise
their children and on the economic interests of the private schools. Re-
garding the rights of parents, Justice McReynolds stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to stand-
ardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from pub-
lic teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, cou-
pled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations.34
Justice McReynolds' statement has been interpreted as holding that
states lack the constitutional authority to inculcate students. That point,
however, was not intended by Justice McReynolds. He was not con-
cerned with childrens' rights. Rather, he focused on the right and "high
duty"35 of parents to prepare their children for the responsibilities of
adulthood through the process of value inculcation. Far from repudiat-
ing the function of value inculcation, Justice McReynolds recognized its
importance. He merely took the narrower position that states cannot
interfere with the authority of parents to inculcate their own children.
After this brief recognition of parental rights, the Court then dis-
cussed the liberty of private schools, which "have business and property
for which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction
through the unwarranted compulsion which [state authorities] are exer-
cising over present and prospective patrons of their schools. '3 6 Thus, the
Court held that the schools could seek judicial "protection against arbi-
trary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with their patrons and the
consequent destruction of their business and property."37 Injunctions
therefore may issue "to protect business enterprises against interference
with the freedom of patrons or customers." 3a This portion of the opinion
proves that the decision did not rest on the rights of students or even on
parental rights. Rather, the Court's holding rested on the violation of
private schools' economic rights.
Meyer and Pierce both failed to set forth any theory regarding free
speech rights of public school students. Decided under the influence of
16. In addition, most states permit children to attend school between the ages of 6 and 21. S.
GOLDSTEIN & E. GEE, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (2d ed.
1980).
34. 268 U.S. at 535.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 536.
38. Id.
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the now discredited liberty of contract doctrine, these cases have no more
enduring validity than Lochner v. New York.39 Not only did Meyer and
Pierce fail to discuss freedom of speech considerations, but neither even
remotely mentioned the concept of the public school or classroom as a
marketplace of ideas. To suggest that these cases support the First
Amendment rights of students in public schools is misleading.
C. Freedom of Expression of Public School Students in the Classroom
The first significant United States Supreme Court case that upheld
the First Amendment rights of public school students and questioned, by
implication, the constitutionality of value inculcation by the state was
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.4' Speaking through
Justice Jackson, the Court held that public school students could not be
compelled to participate in compulsory flag salute ceremonies. Although
challenged by Jehovah's Witnesses who asserted that the practice vio-
lated both their religious freedom and their freedom of speech,4" the
Court did not decide the case on the narrow grounds of the Free Exercise
Clause. Rather, the Court held that the compulsory flag salute violated
the right of students to exercise their freedom of expression. Recognizing
that "censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by
our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present
danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and pun-
ish,"'42 the Court held that "involuntary affirmation could be com-
manded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than
silence."4 3
In discussing the applicability of the First Amendment to public ed-
ucation, Justice Jackson made two pertinent points. First, Justice Jack-
son stated his concern with the potential for public school officials to
abuse their authority by instituting programs of political or religious
indoctrination:
Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction
and political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class,
creed, party, or faction. If it is to impose any ideological discipline,
however, each party or denomination must seek to control, or fail-
ing that, to weaken the influence of the educational system.'W
39. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The analysis in Lochner formed the foundation for the Court's
rationale in both Meyer and Pierce. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
40. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
41. Id. at 630.
42. Id. at 633.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 637.
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To Justice Jackson and the majority in Barnette, the compulsory flag sa-
lute and accompanying pledge of allegiance was a naked attempt by the
state to engage in narrow ideological indoctrination of students, a prac-
tice prohibited by the First Amendment.45
Second, Justice Jackson expressly recognized the role of public edu-
cation in preparing young people to participate in the democratic pro-
cess. Noting that boards of education have "important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions,"46 he nevertheless held that they must
perform these functions "within the limits of the Bill of Rights."'47 "That
they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous pro-
tection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount impor-
tant principles of our government as mere platitudes."48 Thus, Justice
Jackson clearly recognized competing constitutional principles: public
schools serve the critical and distinctive purpose of inculcating young
people with fundamental values and attitudes that will prepare them for
citizenship, but this goal will not be met by narrow ideological indoctri-
nation that stifles the free exchange of ideas upon which effective democ-
racy depends. Nevertheless, to state that public school students have a
First Amendment right to be free from ideological indoctrination does
not mean that the public school classroom is a marketplace of ideas to
which students have a right of access.
The leading Supreme Court decision upholding First Amendment
freedom of expression rights of public school students is Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.49 Speaking for the
Court, Justice Fortas held that the First Amendment barred the suspen-
sion of students who violated a school regulation by wearing black arm-
bands to protest the Vietnam War. To justify prohibiting the expression
of a particular opinion, school officials must show that such expression
would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."5 This required
proof was lacking in Tinker. 1
Justice Fortas found it significant that prohibiting the wearing of
45. Id. at 642.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
50. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
51. 393 U.S. at 508-09, 514.
rVol. 12:1
Fall 19841 FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF STUDENTS
political insignia was not content-neutral." Other students were permit-
ted to wear "buttons relating to national political campaigns"" and even
"the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism."54 One particular
symbol expressing one particular idea "was singled out for
prohibition."55
Justice Fortas in dictum also discussed his perception of the public
school as a marketplace of ideas. Public schools, he stated, are not "en-
claves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute author-
52. In Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that "above
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id. at 95. Several subse-
quent cases similarly have struck down regulations of speech because they were content-based.
E.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down a state university regulation that
permitted the use of university facilities by student organizations except religious groups that
desired to use the facilities for worship and religious speech); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (striking down a city ordinance that permitted some commercial
but no noncommercial advertising on billboards); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61 (1981) (striking down a city ordinance that prohibited all forms of live entertainment in the
city); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (striking down a
statute that prohibited monthly bill inserts discussing controversial public policy issues); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down a statute that prohibited corpora-
tions from spending corporate funds to.express views on public issues not directly related to
the corporation's business); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking
down a statute that prohibited the advertising of contraceptives).
Despite the apparently absolute nature of the rule announced in Mosley, other cases have
permitted content-based regulations. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974) (upholding a ban on the sale of political advertising within the interior of rapid
transit vehicles even though commercial and public service oriented advertising was sold) (see
infra text accompanying notes 125-28); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding a ban
on partisan political speech on a military base although other speech was permitted). A plural-
ity of the Court expressly criticized the principle of content-neutrality in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding a city ordinance requir-
ing the dispersal of "adult" movie theaters while not requiring the dispersal of theaters not
exhibiting "adult" movies). In his plurality opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the degree of
protection accorded expression may vary depending on its content. Id. at 66-71. He stated
that sexually explicit speech, near the borderline between protected and unprotected speech, is
less deserving of First Amendment protection than is political speech. Id. at 70. This view
apparently was adopted by a majority of the Court in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982), which upheld a child pornography statute even though the material was not obscene
under the test of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In the areas of commercial speech
and sexually explicit speech, particularly where there is distribution to children or to a captive
audience, the Court is not reluctant to uphold content-based regulations. Indeed, the principle
of content-neutrality has come under increasing attack by commentators. See, e.g., Farber,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980);
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981);
Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1854
(1983).
53. 393 U.S. at 510.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 510-11.
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ity over their students."56 Therefore, "students may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to commu-
nicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments
that are officially approved."57 As a result, "school officials cannot sup-
press 'expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to
contend.' "58
The presence of a content-based regulation should have sufficed as a
narrower basis for the decision. Such a regulation discriminates among
competing viewpoints within the same category of ideas. 9 In Tinker, the
regulation prohibited political speech that criticized American policy in
Vietnam, but permitted political speech on other topics. Content-based
regulations that discriminate against particular political viewpoints are
closely akin to the compulsory flag salute requirement in Barnette6°
They have the potential of imposing narrow political or partisan
indoctrination.
The relevance of Justice Fortas' discussion of the public school as a
marketplace of ideas is questionable. Throughout his opinion, he empha-
sized that no evidence showed that wearing black armbands materially or
substantially disrupted the educational process.61 Teaching and learning
continued; normal classroom activities remained essentially unchanged.62
The statement that political expression which does not affect classroom
activities is protected by the First Amendment differs substantially from
the bald assertion that the First Amendment permits teachers and stu-
dents to decide the content of those activities. Justice Fortas held that
the First Amendment protects speech in the classroom if that speech is
ineffective and largely ignored by others. If the speech becomes contro-
versial and initiates debate in the classroom, it loses its First Amendment
protection because it now "materially and substantially interfere[s]
with"63 the educational process. Were the public school classroom a true
marketplace of ideas, the proper function of the courts would be to guard
controversial speech that would stir the type of debate invited by the
First Amendment.64 Justice Fortas concluded to the contrary: ineffec-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d at 749).
59. See supra note 52.
60. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See supra text accompanying notes 40-48.
61. 393 U.S. at 508-09, 514.
62. Id. at 514.
63. Id. at 505 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d at 749).
64. Protecting controversial speech raises the problem of the hostile audience or heckler's
veto. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) upheld a disorderly conduct conviction of a
streetcorner speaker who refused to cease speaking when so directed by police who feared that
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tive speech is protected; effective speech is not.
In a strong dissent,6 5 Justice Black refused to recognize the public
school classroom as a marketplace of ideas. He denied the assertion of
the majority that "it has been the 'unmistakable holding of this Court for
almost 50 years' that 'students' and 'teachers' take with them into the
'schoolhouse gate' constitutional rights to 'freedom of speech or expres-
sion.' Even Meyer did not hold that."66 In his view, the prohibition
against wearing political insignia in a public school was not a content-
based censorship of ideas, beliefs, or speech. Rather, it was a valid deter-
mination by the school that the classroom was not an appropriate forum
for the exercise of First Amendment rights. He denied that public school
students were "sent to the schools at public expense to broadcast political
or any other views to educate and inform the public."6 7 Quoting the
adage that "children are to be seen not heard,"68 Justice Black hoped to
"be permitted to harbor the thought that taxpayers send children to
school on the premise that at their age they need to learn, not teach."69
Besides rejecting the argument that the public school classroom is a
public forum for the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, Justice
Black recognized the long history and the critical importance of the in-
culcative function of public education:
Change has been said to be truly the law of life but sometimes the
old and the tried and true are worth holding. The schools of this
Nation have undoubtedly contributed to giving us tranquility and
to making us a more law-abiding people. Uncontrolled and uncon-
trollable liberty is an enemy to domestic peace. We cannot close
our eyes to the fact that some of the country's greatest problems
are crimes committed by the youth, too many of school age.
School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and impor-
tant part of training our children to be good citizens-to be better
the reaction of the speaker's hostile audience would result in violence. In dissent, Justice Black
noted that "if, in the name of preserving order, [law enforcement officers] ever can interfere
with a lawful public speaker, they first must make all reasonable efforts to protect him." Id. at
326 (Black, J., dissenting). Although Feiner has never been overruled, subsequent cases appear
to have limited its holding to the narrow factual situation where police are unable to control
the hostile audience. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550 (1965) (75 to 80 police
officers separated 1,500 peaceful demonstrators from a crowd of 100 to 300 onlookers); Ed-
wards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 230-31, 233 n.7 (1963) (demonstrators attracted a
crowd of between 200 and 300 peaceful onlookers; 30 police officers were at the scene and
adequate reinforcements were readily available).
65. 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 521 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
67. 393 U.S. at 522.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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citizens.7°
Neither Barnette nor Tinker support the broad view that the public
elementary and secondary classroom is a marketplace of ideas. Barnette
stands for the much more limited proposition that state and school offi-
cials cannot engage in narrow religious or political indoctrination of stu-
dents.71 When the sweeping dicta of Tinker is set aside, that case simply
recognizes that school officials are powerless to punish students for ex-
pressing partisan political viewpoints when that expression does not in-
terfere with the educational process.7" Both cases thus support the
premise of this Article: state and school officials may engage in the
traditional function of value inculcation, but not in the practice of nar-
row political, partisan, or religious indoctrination.
D. Academic Freedom in Public Schools
In discussing First Amendment rights of teachers, the Supreme
Court has focused on the principle of academic freedom and the concept
of public schools as a marketplace of ideas. Chief Justice Warren's plu-
rality opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire73 discussed the critical impor-
tance of college professors' liberties in the areas of academic freedom and
political expression and association:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American univer-
sities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train
our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual lead-
ers in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by
man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. . . . Scholarship
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teach-
ers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.74
In a similar vein ten years later, Justice Brennan, in Keyishian v.
Board of Regents,75 stated that academic freedom
is of transcendent value to all of us and . . . is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. . . . The classroom is
peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future de-
pends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
70. Id. at 524.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55, 59-60.
73. 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion).
74. Id. at 250.
75. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection. ',7
6
Although both Sweezy and Keyishian discussed the principle of aca-
demic freedom and the need for open inquiry in education, their ration-
ale is inapposite to the First Amendment rights of students in the public
elementary and secondary classroom for three reasons. First, both cases
involved state investigations into the membership of university faculty in
allegedly subversive organizations. The plurality opinion in Sweezy re-
versed a contempt citation based on the failure of a university lecturer to
answer questions posed by a state attorney general.77 It was uncertain
whether the state legislature had authorized the attorney general to make
such an inquiry.78 Keyishian struck down a loyalty-security program
that permitted the discharge of a university teacher for nonparticipating
membership in a subversive organization.79 Both decisions were based
on the First Amendment rights of university teachers outside the class-
room. Neither case turned on whether the classroom is a marketplace of
ideas. The Court's discussions of academic freedom and the need for
open inquiry in the classroom were merely dicta.
Second, both cases dealt with First Amendment rights of university
teachers, not elementary and secondary students. Unlike university
faculty,80 public elementary and secondary students are minors in a cap-
tive audience, which permits governmental regulation of free expression
in ways normally not permitted. To the contrary, university faculty
members are noncaptive adults able to exercise First Amendment
freedoms.
Third, Sweezy and Keyishian discussed the importance and long-
standing tradition of academic freedom at the collegiate level. This tradi-
tion is not present at the elementary and secondary levels of education.
Elementary and secondary teachers ordinarily lack the tradition of intel-
76. Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943)).
77. 354 U.S. at 239-44.
78. Id. at 253.
79. 385 U.S. at 609-10. It is well settled that an individual cannot be punished or sub-
jected to burdens for affiliating with an organization engaged in unlawful conduct unless the
person both knows of the illegal aims of the organization and shares a specific intent to further
such aims. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11
(1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The loyalty program in Keyishian
provided for the discharge of any teacher who was a member of a subversive organization, if
the teacher knew of the illegal purposes of that organization, regardless of whether or not the
teacher shared a specific intent to further those illegal purposes. Thus, the prohibition was
"overbroad" in violation of the First Amendment. 385 U.S. at 605-10.
80. See infra part II of this Article.
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lectual and pedagogical independence, discretion in the choice of teach-
ing materials and subject matter emphasis, and the scholarly
qualifications of college and university professors."' Additionally, public
elementary and secondary schools more often and more pervasively act
in loco parentis2 with respect to children. As one commentator noted:
The central fact in the distinction between higher and lower educa-
tion is the role of value inculcation in the teaching process. The
public schools in the United States traditionally have viewed instil-
ling the young with societal values as a significant part of the
schools educational mission. Such a mission is directly opposed to
the vision of education that underlies the premises of academic
freedom in higher education.8 3
The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction between elemen-
tary and higher education. Contrasting the education at church-related
colleges to elementary and secondary education, the Court stated:
There is substance to the contention that college students are
less impressionable and less susceptible to . . . indoctrination.
Common observation would seem to support that view. . . . The
skepticism of the college student is not an inconsiderable barrier to
any attempt or tendency to subvert the. . . limitations [prohibit-
ing religious instruction]. Furthermore, by their very nature, col-
lege and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities for
sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal disciplines.
Many . . . colleges and universities are characterized by a high
degree of academic freedom and seek to evoke free and critical re-
sponses from their students.84
Equating academic freedom and the openness of scholarly inquiry at the
university level with classroom education at the elementary and secon-
dary level is a dubious proposition at best.
81. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), ajffd, 448 F.2d 1242
(1st Cir. 1971).
82. Id. "In loco parentis" means "in the place of parents." This doctrine justifies the
authority of schools to discipline students for infractions of school rules, just as parents disci-
pline children for the infraction of parental rules. See, e.g., Indiana State Personnel Bd. v.
Jackson, 244 Ind. 321, 192 N.E.2d 740 (1963); Harris v. Galilley, 125 Pa. Super. 505, 189 A.
779 (1937).
83. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine
What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1342-43 (1976).
84. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (plurality opinion). In Tilton, the
Supreme Court upheld the federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-
204, Title I §§ 101-111, 77 Stat. 363, 364-70 (repealed 1972), which authorized the appropria-
tion of federal funds for construction at colleges and universities, including those that were
church-related. On the same day, the Court struck down state payments of salary supplements
to teachers in parochial and other nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). One significant distinction between the cases involved the
perceived difference between the nature and function of elementary and secondary education
and college and university education.
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The leading Supreme Court case upholding First Amendment rights
of public elementary and secondary teachers is Pickering v. Board of Ed-
ucation."5 In Pickering, the Court held that a public school teacher could
not be dismissed for writing a nonlibelous letter to the editor of a news-
paper which was highly critical of the Board of Education and the Super-
intendent of Schools. 6 In holding that public employees normally do
not relinquish their rights to comment on work-related matters of public
interest, 7 the Court clearly recognized the First Amendment rights of
teachers outside the classroom. The case, however, furnishes no author-
ity for the proposition that the same expression would have been pro-
tected had it occurred in the classroom.
The few Supreme Court cases affirming First Amendment rights of
teachers do not address or determine the First Amendment freedoms of
students in the public elementary or secondary school classroom. These
prior cases involved expressive and associational activities of public
teachers outside the classroom, and most dealt specifically with college
and university professors.
E. Judicial Review of the Public School Curriculum
Except for the substantive due process case of Meyer v. Nebraska,8
the only Supreme Court decision addressing the constitutional limita-
tions on state power to determine the curriculum of public schools is
Epperson v. Arkansas.9 In Epperson, the Court struck down an Arkan-
sas statute90 that prohibited its public schools from teaching that man
evolved from other species of life.91 In an unreported opinion, the Chan-
cery Court of Arkansas held that the statute violated the First Amend-
ment because it "tends to hinder the quest for knowledge, restrict the
85. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
86. Id. at 566, 574.
87. Id. at 568.
88. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See supra text accompanying notes 22-30.
89. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
90. Act of Oct. 6, 1928, Initiated Act No. 1, 1929 Ark. Acts 1518, provided in pertinent
part:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any University, College,
Normal, Public School, or other institution of the State, which is supported in whole
or in part from public funds derived by State and local taxation to teach the theory or
doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals and also
it shall be unlawful for any teacher, textbook commission, or other authority exercis-
ing the power to select textbooks for above mentioned educational institutions to
adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches the doctrine or theory
that mankind descended or ascended from a lower order of animals.
91. The best known work setting forth the biological theory of evolution is C. DARWIN,
THE ORIGIN OF SpEciEs (1859). Anti-evolutionists argue the opposing view of creationism,
which is based upon a literal interpretation of Genesis.
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freedom to learn, and restrain the freedom to teach."'9 2 The Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed in a two sentence opinion, expressing "no opin-
ion on the question whether the Act prohibits any explanation of the
theory of evolution or merely prohibits teaching that the theory is true
. . "I Despite this statement, counsel for Arkansas argued before the
United States Supreme Court that Arkansas interpreted the statute "to
mean that to make a student aware of the theory. . . just to teach that
there was such a theory" would be grounds for dismissal of the teacher
involved.94 Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court, stated that "[t]he
overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge
a particular segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is
deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine. . . ,"I To Jus-
tice Fortas, the Arkansas law was an attempt at narrow religious
indoctrination:
Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality.
Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools
and universities all discussion of the origin of man. The law's ef-
fort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory be-
cause of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally
read. Plainly, the law is contrary to the mandate of the First, and
in violation of the Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution.
96
Critical to Justice Fortas' decision was the broad interpretation of
the statute argued by the State of Arkansas.97 Under this interpretation,
the statute did not merely remove all discussion of a particular body of
knowledge from the school curriculum, but made it a criminal act to
teach or even to mention the existence of the nonreligious theory of
evolution. The statute did not, however, prohibit the teaching of the con-
trary religious theory of creationism. Justice Fortas believed that the
statute discriminated against a nonreligious idea in favor of a competing
religious idea,9" and thus censored religious views in violation of the First
Amendment.99
92. 393 U.S. at 100 (quoting unpublished Arkansas Chancery Court opinion).
93. 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967).
94. 393 U.S. at 102-03.
95. Id. at 103.
96. Id. at 109.
97. See supra text accompanying note 94.
98. 393 U.S. at 107-08 n.15 (quoting Leflar, Legal Liability for the Exercise of Free Speech,
10 ARK. L. REv. 155, 158 (1956)).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I, provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." The first
clause, referred to as the Establishment Clause, prohibits government from aiding religion.
The second clause, the Free Exercise Clause, prohibits government from interfering with reli-
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Black took the view that while the
state could remove a particular body of knowledge from the public
school curriculum, it could not favor one religious idea or theory over
competing ideas or theories within that body of knowledge:
It is plain that a state law prohibiting all teaching of human
development or biology is constitutionally quite different from a
law that compels a teacher to teach as true only one theory of a
given doctrine. It would be difficult to make a First Amendment
case out of a state law eliminating the subject of higher mathemat-
ics, or astronomy, or biology from its curriculum."
While Justice Black stated that "there is no reason I can imagine
why a State is without power to withdraw from its curriculum any sub-
ject deemed too emotional and controversial for its public schools," 101 he
was extremely sensitive to the danger of permitting school officials to
choose among competing religious and nonreligious viewpoints. Justice
Black suggested that the teaching of evolution to the exclusion of crea-
tionism presents the same constitutional difficulty as the reverse
situation:
[T]he State must be neutral, not favoring one religious or anti-reli-
gious view over another. . . . Since there is no indication that
[creationism] is included in the curriculum . . . , does not the re-
moval of the subject of evolution leave the State in a neutral posi-
tion toward these . . . competing religious and anti-religious
doctrines? Unless this Court is prepared simply to write off as pure
nonsense the views of those who consider evolution an anti-reli-
gious doctrine, then this issue presents problems under the Estab-
lishment Clause far more troublesome than are discussed in the
Court's opinion.102
Although Justice Black and the majority framed the issue in terms
of the religion clauses, a parallel can be drawn to First Amendment free-
dom of speech. Just as government can neither advance nor inhibit reli-
gion,10 3 government regulation of speech often must be content-
neutral."°4 The recurring theme throughout the opinions of Justices For-
tas and Black is that while a state cannot discriminate against certain
religious and nonreligious viewpoints on a particular topic, the state may
gion. Taken together, the First Amendment religion clauses command government neutrality
in religious matters. See, eg., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
100. 393 U.S. 97, 111 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black preferred to "either strike
down the Arkansas Act as too vague to enforce, or remand to the State Supreme Court for
clarification of its holding and opinion." Id. at 114.
101. Id. at 113.
102. Id.
103. See supra note 99.
104. See supra note 52.
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decide to delete all discussion of that topic from the curriculum of public
elementary or secondary education. While creationism cannot be taught
to the exclusion of evolution, the state can remove biology from the pre-
scribed list of courses taught in its public schools. Even within a particu-
lar discipline, the state can allocate finite resources and time to omit
particular topics from the curriculum. For example, in teaching English,
state or school authorities can require instruction in composition to the
exclusion of literature, or require teaching Shakespeare to the exclusion
of Spenser. Although state and school officials have the authority to re-
quire that certain subjects or topics be taught to the exclusion of others,
they cannot pick and choose among competing political or religious
viewpoints. While public school authorities can prescribe the curriculum
and engage in value inculcation, they cannot mandate narrow political,
partisan, or religious indoctrination. 105
II. The Constitutional Status of Public School Students-
Minors in a Captive Audience
From the perspective of the First Amendment, public elementary
and secondary students have a unique status. As part of a captive audi-
ence, they cannot refuse to receive information disseminated to them. 106
Additionally, the constitutional rights of minors are not coextensive with
those held by adults. 10 7 This section will explore both of these factors.
A. Public School Students as a Captive Audience
Any discussion of the applicability of First Amendment freedoms to
the public school classroom must recognize the fact that students in the
classroom constitute a captive audience. The basic premise underlying
compulsory school attendance laws' 0 8 is that states can compel students
to attend school, sit in class, and read, hear, study, and learn certain
specified bodies of knowledge prescribed by state authorities.109
The existence of a captive audience permits government to impose
regulations on free expression that normally are not permissible. ' 10 Reg-
ulations of speech upheld under the captive audience rationale are not
intended to restrict ideas and beliefs, but rather to protect the privacy
105. See 393 U.S. at 103, 107-08 n.15, 109 (Fortas, J.); see also id. at 111-13 (Black, J.,
concurring).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 108-09, 134-38.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 150-54, 159-65.
108. See supra note 33.
109. See S. GOLDSTEIN & E. GEE, supra note 33, at 57.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 125-28.
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interests of individuals."' This rationale permits persons to decline to
receive ideas, information, and messages that they do not want to receive.
This point was expressly recognized by Justice Douglas in Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollak."' Pollak involved the practice of a privately-
owned street railway company that amplified radio programs through
loudspeakers in its streetcars and buses. Although the majority upheld
this practice,' 13 Justice Douglas argued that the right of privacy, or the
"right to be let alone," 114 was infringed when a captive audience was
subjected to "coercion to make people listen."'15 Noting that "in a prac-
tical sense" riders of streetcars and buses "are forced to ride, since this
mode of transportation is today essential for many thousands," '116 he
stated that these riders constituted a captive audience. Although Justice
Douglas framed his objections in terms of a right of privacy, there were
some First Amendment implications as well:
When we force people to listen to another's ideas, we give the prop-
agandist a powerful weapon. . . . The right of privacy should in-
clude the right to pick and choose from competing entertainments,
competing propaganda, competing political philosophies ...
The strength of our system is in the dignity, the resourcefulness,
and the independence of our people. Our confidence is in their
ability as individuals to make the wisest choice. That system can-
not flourish if regimentation takes hold. The right of privacy...
is a powerful deterrent to any one who would control men's
minds.1 7
Justice Douglas' opinion in Pollak was ratified in part by the
Supreme Court's decision in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights.'1 8 In
Lehman, the Court upheld a municipal policy of prohibiting political ad-
vertising but allowing other types of advertising on city-owned transit
vehicles." 9 Quoting from Justice Douglas' dissent in Pollak, Justice
Blackmun in his plurality opinion noted that the "streetcar audience is a
111. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 118-28); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)
(upholding a federal statute permitting an addressee of mail to request that the post office
prohibit all future mailings to the addressee from a particular sender); Breard v. City of Alex-
andria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting solicitors from knocking on
doors of private residences without a prior invitation from the owner or occupant).
112. 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 463-66 (majority opinion).
114. Id. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 468.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 469.
118. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 300 n.1.
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captive audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not of choice." 120
He thus concluded that "viewers of. . . streetcar signs [have] no 'choice
or volition' to observe such advertising and [have] the message 'thrust
upon them by all the arts and devices that skill can produce . .. The
radio can be turned off, but not so the . . . streetcar placard.' "1121
Furthermore, the Court held that the interior of a streetcar or bus
does not constitute a public forum where First Amendment rights can be
exercised.' 22 Addressing the argument that the interior of a bus is a pub-
lic forum, Justice Blackmun stated: "Here, we have no open spaces, no
meeting hall, park, street corner, or other public thoroughfare. Instead,
the city is engaged in commerce."' 23 Merely because public property
was involved, the public ownership of that property did not convert it
into a public forum for the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.' 24
The Court in Lehman held that because commuters are a captive
audience and because the interior of a bus is not a traditional public fo-
rum, the government may impose regulations on free expression that
normally are not permissible. The existence of a captive audience creates
a situation "different from the traditional settings where First Amend-
ment values inalterably prevail."' 25 In captive audience situations, "[t]he
legislature may recognize degrees of evil and adapt its legislation accord-
ingly."' 126 For these reasons, the Lehman Court upheld the power of
government to distinguish different types of advertising. Noting that the
sale of political advertising would cause streetcar riders to "be subjected
to the blare of political propaganda,"'' 27 the Court held that "the mana-
gerial decision to limit car card space to innocuous and less controversial
commercial and service oriented advertising does not rise to the dignity
of a First Amendment violation." 2 ' This part of the Court's opinion is
120. Id. at 302 (quoting Pollak, 343 U.S. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
121. 418 U.S. at 302 (quoting Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)).
122. Noting that "American constitutional jurisprudence, in the light of the First Amend-
ment, has been jealous to preserve access to public places for purposes of free speech," id.,
Justice Blackmun nevertheless stated that "the nature of the forum and the conflicting inter-
ests involved have remained important in determining the degree of protection afforded by the
Amendment to the speech in question." Id. at 302-03.
123. Id. at 303.
124. Other cases are in accord. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes); United States Pos-
tal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (residential mailboxes);
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (United States Army base); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39 (1966) (grounds of a county jail).
125. 418 U.S. at 302.
126. Id. (quoting Packer Corp., 285 U.S. at 110).
127. 418 U.S. at 304.
128. Id.
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particularly significant because it expressly upheld the power of govern-
ment to treat different types of expression differently, depending upon its
content.
In his concurring opinion,129 Justice Douglas agreed with many of
Justice Blackmun's points. First, he rejected the claim that "the city has
turned its buses into free speech forums and. . . is now prohibited by
the First Amendment ... from refusing space for political advertise-
ments." 130 According to Justice Douglas, a bus is "not a park or side-
walk or other meeting place for discussion, any more than is a highway.
It is only a way to get to work or back home. The fact that it is owned
and operated by the city does not without more make it a forum." '131
He also agreed with Justice Blackmun that bus riders constitute a
captive audience with privacy interests that should be protected:
While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those
who wish to listen, he has no right to force his message upon an
audience incapable of declining to receive it. In my view the right
of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy
precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public trans-
portation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this cap-
tive audience.1 32
Justice Douglas rejected the argument that the interior of a bus consti-
tuted a public forum, thereby requiring a First Amendment right of ac-
cess. Consequently, the city did not violate the petitioner's First
Amendment rights by refusing to sell advertising.
The lesson of Lehman is clear. The interior of a city-owned bus is
not a public forum for the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. The
passengers are a captive audience. A city has authority to protect the
captive audience by refusing to allow political expression to be thrust
upon that audience, even though commercial and public-service oriented
expression is permitted.1 33
There are some obvious similarities between the interior of a bus and
the public school classroom. Neither is a "meeting hall, park, street cor-
ner, or other public thoroughfare." '34 Just as the City of Shaker Heights
was engaged in the business of transportation, 135 public schools are en-
gaged in the business of education. Both situations involve a captive au-
dience on public property that is not a traditional public forum.
129. Id. at 305 (Douglas, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 306.
132. Id. at 307.
133. Id. at 304. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28.
134. 418 U.S. at 303.
135. Id.
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Therefore, the state has the authority-if not the constitutional duty-to
avoid imposing political messages on captive audiences.
Students in the public school classroom, like commuters on a bus,
are not free from all unwanted government intrusions on their privacy.
The Court in Lehman expressly upheld the city's authority to display
commercial and public-service oriented advertising in the interior of
buses.' 36 It was only "the blare of political propaganda" '37 that the city
refused to permit. Similarly, public schools can disseminate information
to their students and require them to receive it, suggesting that public
schools may engage in the traditional practice of value inculcation in the
classroom. It is only narrow political, partisan, and religious indoctrina-
tion that is prohibited.
There are, of course, obvious differences between the interior of a
bus and the public school classroom. These differences give additional
weight to the authority of public schools to impart information to captive
students. For example, a bus and a classroom serve dissimilar functions.
Buses are means of transportation, while classrooms are means of educa-
tion. Communication and the dissemination of information are crucial
to the process of education, but not to riding a bus. Communication in
the classroom, however, is not the same as freedom of expression. Class-
room speech and exchange of ideas is primarily for the purpose of facili-
tating the learning process, including value inculcation, and not for the
sake of promoting a "free trade in ideas."' 38 The dissemination of infor-
mation justifies the very existence of public education, while it is irrele-
vant to a municipality's operation of a public transportation system.
Thus, the authority of the state to disseminate information in the public
school classroom is much greater than the interest of a city to sell adver-
tising inside rapid transit vehicles. Moreover, the captive audience in
the classroom consists of children. Commuters on a bus are both adults
and children. As the following discussion reveals, First Amendment
rights of children are not coextensive with those of adults. 3 9
B. First Amendment Rights of Minors
The Supreme Court has long recognized that states have the consti-
tutional authority to impose regulations on children that would be con-
stitutionally unacceptable if imposed on adults." Although the states'
136. Id. at 303-04.
137. Id. at 304.
138. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See supra
note 6.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 150-54, 159-66.
140. Id.
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powers are not boundless, they can restrict the First Amendment rights
of children to a greater degree than they can restrict the same rights of
adults.
14 1
One leading case that exemplifies this principle is Prince v. Massa-
chusetts.142 This case arose after Sarah Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, per-
mitted her children and her nine year old niece to distribute religious
literature on a public street. She was subsequently convicted for violat-
ing Massachusetts' child labor laws. 143 The Supreme Court upheld the
conviction.
The majority opinion addressed the conflict between the respective
powers of the state and parents to control children and to regulate their
training, particularly in the context of religious freedom. The Court rec-
ognized that two constitutional rights were involved. First, the parent
has a right "to bring up the child in the way he should go," which for
Mrs. Prince meant "to teach him the tenets and the practices of their
faith."'" The second right concerned the child's freedom of religion,
including the right "to preach the gospel." 1 4 ' The Court expressly recog-
nized the vital importance of these liberties: "The parent's conflict with
the state over control of the child and his training is serious enough when
only secular matters are concerned. It becomes the more so when an
element of religious conviction enters."' 46 As fundamental and sacred as
these private interests are, however, the Court recognized the overriding
interest of society in protecting the welfare of children. This interest is
"no mere corporate concern of official authority," but rather "the inter-
est of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both
safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and
independent well-developed men and citizens."'147 Here, then, is a clear
141. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944).
142. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
143. Act of June 19, 1913, ch. 831, § 11, 1913 Mass. Acts 930, 933, amended by Act of
Aug. 12, 1939, ch. 461, § 7, 1939 Mass. Acts 622, 625 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 149, § 69 (West 1982)), provided in pertinent part:
No boy under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall sell, expose or offer for sale any
newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of merchandise of any de-
scription, or exercise the trade of bootblack or scavenger, or any other trade, in any
street or public place.
In addition, the statute makes it an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment for any "par-
ent, guardian or custodian having a minor under his control" to compel or permit "such minor
to work in violation of any provision of sections sixty to seventy-four, inclusive . MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 81 (West 1982).
144. 321 U.S. at 164.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 165.
147. Id.
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recognition of the principle that parental rights and First Amendment
freedoms must sometimes give way to a regulation of the conduct of chil-
dren, even though the regulation imposes incidental burdens on personal
liberties. Although the Court recognized that several previous cases had
sustained constitutional challenges to exercises of state authority over
children,148 it also provided examples of valid exercises of state authority
over children. "Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well be-
ing, the state . . . may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other
ways." 14
9
More significantly, the Court expressly recognized that children can
be regulated by the state in ways that adults cannot. "Concededly a stat-
ute or ordinance identical in terms with § 69,150 except that it is applica-
ble to adults or all persons generally, would be invalid. But the mere fact
a state could not wholly prohibit this form of adult activity. . . does not
mean it cannot do so for children." 15' Therefore, the Court concluded
that the "state's authority over children's activities is broader than over
like actions of adults."' 152
The Court did more than merely state the proposition. It provided a
rational justification for permitting the state to exercise more authority
over children than over adults. "A democratic society rests, for its con-
tinuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
148. Id. at 165-66 (citing West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
149. 321 U.S. at 166. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which held that the
application of a compulsory attendance law to Old Order Amish, who objected to formal
education past the eighth grade for religious reasons, violated the First Amendment Free Exer-
cise Clause. While affirming the general validity of compulsory education laws, the Court held
that such a law could not be applied to the Old Order Amish because the state had not proved
that compulsory education after the eighth grade was necessary to promote a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Id. at 221-27. The holding of the case was very narrow, and the Court
suggested that it would not extend the holding beyond the facts of the case. Id. at 236. Cf.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption
for members of the Old Order Amish from payment of Social Security taxes).
150. See supra note 143.
151. 321 U.S. at 167-68 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 168. In other situations, the Supreme Court has also held that the constitu-
tional rights of children are not co-extensive with those of adults. See, e.g., McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Constitution does not
require trial by jury in juvenile court delinquency proceedings despite their quasi-criminal na-
ture). However, other Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights that attach to adults in criminal
proceedings also apply to juveniles in delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970) (presumption of innocence and standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (notice of charges, right to free appointed counsel if
indigent, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to confrontation and cross-
examination).
[Vol. 12:1
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against
impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection." 153
Thus, the Court recognized that the state has a vital duty to prepare our
nation's youth for the responsible exercise of the rights and obligations of
citizenship. This duty affords ample justification for the state's authority
to engage in value inculcation in its schools, as well as to take other
measures to prepare youth for adulthood.
The Court also recognized that the fullest exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms by children might have a deleterious effect upon them,
although not upon adults who exercise those same freedoms:
The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage in propa-
gandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other
matters, may and at times does create situations difficult enough
for adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, espe-
cially of tender years, to face. Other harmful possibilities could be
stated, of emotional excitement and psychological or physical in-
jury. Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full
and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves. 154
Although the Court spoke of "emotional excitement and psycholog-
ical or physical injury"15 in the context of speaking or preaching on
street corners, the same or similar effects might be felt by children in a
public school classroom. In fact, several courts and commentators have
made this point. 56
153. 321 U.S. at 168.
154. Id. at 169-70.
155. Id. at 170.
156. See, e.g., Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925
(1978), which upheld a decision of school officials to prohibit students from distributing a
questionnaire seeking opinions of other students on topics such as "premarital sex, contracep-
tion, homosexuality, masturbation and. . . 'sexual experience.'" 563 F.2d at 515. The court
of appeals expressly recognized the authority of school officials to restrict freedom of expres-
sion on the part of students when the restricted expression had the potential of causing psycho-
logical or emotional injury to other students. Id. at 516-20. Several commentators have urged
that the prevention of psychological or emotional injury is a constitutional basis on which to
restrict freedom of expression by students in public schools. See, e.g., Diamond, The First
Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REv. 477,
494-95, 502-05 (1981); Gyory, The Constitutional Rights of Public School Pupils, 40 FORDHAM
L. REV. 201, 219-20 (1971). The Supreme Court has recognized the potential for harm result-
ing from the access of children to sexually explicit speech. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the authority of the FCC to admonish a radio station for
broadcasting a recording containing indecent language at a time when children were likely to
be in the listening audience); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968) (stating that
"minors' reading and seeing sex material" can "reasonably be regarded as harmful").
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A second major Supreme Court case affirming the authority of the
state to accord a lesser degree of First Amendment protection to children
is Ginsberg v. New York.157 In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a New York
criminal obscenity statute that prohibited the sale to minors of material
deemed to be obscene to minors but not to adults.158 Speaking for the
majority, Justice Brennan held that "even where there is an invasion of
protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of chil-
dren reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .,,59
After stating that the "well-being of its children is of course a subject
within the State's constitutional power to regulate," 6 ' Justice Brennan
held that two interests justified the limitation on the sale to minors.
First, citing Prince, he noted that "the parents' claim to authority
• . .to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society."'' Justice Brennan also stated that the "legislature could prop-
erly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have
this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the
support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."'' 62
When parents and children conflict, the state may intervene on the side
of the parents and enforce their authority to raise their children as they
deem best. The First Amendment interests of children must give way to
the combined authority of parents and the state.
His second justification addressed the situation where the parents
align on the side of the child in opposition to state authority. According
to Justice Brennan, the state can exercise authority over children despite
a First Amendment conflict. Commenting that the state "also has an
independent interest in the well-being of its youth," 163 he stated:
While the supervision of children's reading may best be left to their
parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot
always be provided and society's transcendent interest in protect-
ing the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale
of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper
for a state to include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of
pornography to children special standards, broader than those em-
bodied in legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of such
157. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
158. Act of June 7, 1965, ch. 326, 1965 N.Y. Laws 480 (current version at N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 235.20-.22 (McKinney 1980)).
159. 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 170).
160. 390 U.S. at 639.
161. Id. (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 166).
162. 390 U.S. at 639.
163. Id. at 640.
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material to adults.164
The Court in Ginsberg reiterated that parental control of children is
not absolute. The state has a paramount interest in providing for the
welfare of children. While not formulating a theory as to why the state
may treat children differently than adults, Justice Brennan quoted a
widely acclaimed article discussing First Amendment principles:
The world of children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free
expression. The factor of immaturity, and perhaps other consider-
ations, impose different rules. . . . [R]egulations of communica-
tion addressed to them need not conform to the requirements of
the First Amendment in the same way as those applicable to
adults.165
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Stewart explained why, in his
view, the theoretical underpinnings of the First Amendment are not fully
applicable to children. 6 6 Referring to the view of Justice Holmes that
the purpose of freedom of expression is to preserve a "free trade in
ideas,"' 167 Justice Stewart discussed the scope of.this freedom. Not only
does freedom of expression encompass the right "to say or write or pub-
lish" what a person wants, but it "secures as well the liberty of each man
to decide for himself what he will read and to what he will listen.' '
68
Therefore, the "Constitution guarantees . . . a society of free choice.
Such a society presupposes the capacity of its members to choose."'' 69
Justice Stewart then recognized that this capacity to choose is not always
present. Its absence may justify governmental regulation of expression.
"When expression occurs in a setting where the capacity to make a
choice is absent, government regulation of that expression may co-exist
with and even implement First Amendment guarantees."' 170  Justice
Stewart noted two instances in which the capacity to choose may be lack-
ing, thus justifying limitations on the person making the choice:
I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some
precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audi-
ence-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is
only upon such a premise. . . that a State may deprive children of
164. Id. at 640 (quoting People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 312, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334-35
(1965) (Fuld, C.J., concurring)).
165. 390 U.S. at 638 n.6 (quoting Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 939 (1963)).
166. 390 U.S. at 648 (Stewart, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 649 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
168. 390 U.S. at 649 (Stewart, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to
vote-deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for
adults. 1
7 1
Justice Stewart makes an incontrovertible point. The First Amend-
ment permits the exercise of those liberties that are essential to the func-
tioning of a democracy. Our democratic system rests upon the presence
of a well-informed, enlightened citizenry which is capable of exercising
the right to vote only after becoming acquainted with the facts, opinions,
and arguments involved in public issues.17 2 Without such knowledge
and without the opportunity for "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
debate, 173 the electorate cannot make knowing and voluntary choices at
the ballot box.
This rationale assumes the existence of voters who are intellectually
and emotionally capable of making rational decisions. Such decisions fa-
cilitate the exchange of ideas and beliefs necessary for a democracy. Mi-
nors often lack full capacity to make choices in an intelligent, rational,
and independent manner.174  Just as the government does not permit
171. Id. at 649-50.
172. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). Professor Meiklejohn is perhaps
the foremost proponent of the theory that the primary purpose of the First Amendment is to
protect political expression. In his view, absolute protection of political speech is essential to
intelligent self-government. Freedom of speech is protected by the First Amendment not for
its own sake, but because it is essential to the democratic political process. All other forms of
speech would be protected only by substantive due process. For an opposing viewpoint, see T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970). Professor Emerson defends
freedom of speech not only as a means of providing for effective participatory democracy, but
also as an end in itself to guarantee the right of individual self-fulfillment and self-realization.
Under this view, many forms of nonpolitical expression receive First Amendment protection.
173. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
174. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion), which struck down a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting a minor from obtaining an abortion without the consent of
either her parents or a court. The statute was defective because the parents or the court could
veto the abortion decision of a minor "who has been determined to be mature and fully compe-
tent to assess the implications of the choice she has made." Id. at 650. In his plurality opinion,
Justice Powell recognized "the general rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the
age of majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently," but "we are
concerned here with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character." Id. The reason
for this uniqueness is that "the abortion decision. . . simply cannot be postponed, or it will be
made by default with far-reaching consequences." Id. at 643. In reviewing past cases, Justice
Powell stated: "We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitu-
tional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing." Id. at 634. Justice Powell elaborated on the
second reason, citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), and Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944):
Second, the Court has held that the States validly may limit the freedom of children
to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with poten-
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children to vote due to their lack of capacity to choose, 175 so too may
society impose outer boundaries on children's freedom of expression.
Ginsberg thus held that the state may limit the access of children to cer-
tain types of sexually explicit material. The Court's holding provides
strong support for the proposition that the public school can also limit
the access of children to ideas, beliefs, and materials that are considered
deleterious to our youth.
III. Board of Education v. Pico
The most recent Supreme Court case concerning First Amendment
rights of public school students is the 1982 decision, Board of Education
v. Pico.'7 6 In Pico, the Court held that the First Amendment limits the
discretion of public school officials to remove books from the school
library.
A. Facts and Background
Several members of the Island Trees Board of Education attended a
conference sponsored by a "politically conservative organization of par-
ents concerned about education legislation in the State of New York."' 177
At this conference, the school board members received a list of books
described by one board member as "objectionable" and by another as
"improper fare for school students."' 78 After determining that several of
the listed books were in either the high school or junior high school li-
brary of the school district, the Board of Education appointed a "Book
Review Committee" of four parents and four school staff members to
read the questioned books and to recommend to the school board those
tially serious consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the recognition
that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them.
443 U.S. at 635.
175. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (plurality opinion) recognized the authority
of the states to limit the voting age to persons 21 and over. Reviewing the constitutionality of
a provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 301-05, 84
Stat. 314, 318-19 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb (1982)), which lowered the voting age
to 18 in both federal and state elections, the Court upheld the provision as applied to federal
elections but held that this provision could not constitutionally be applied to state elections.
400 U.S. at 117-18. Subsequently Congress proposed, and the states ratified, the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment to the federal Constitution, which lowered the voting age to 18 in all federal and
state elections. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
176. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
177. Id. at 856.
178. Id.
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which should be removed from the library. 79 The school board's policy
directed the committee to make its recommendations by "taking into ac-
count the books' 'educational suitability,' 'good taste,' 'relevance,' and
'appropriateness to age and grade level.' "sI Of the eleven questioned
books, the committee recommended that five be retained in the library,
that two be removed, and that one "be made available to students only
with parental approval."'' After the committee reported its recommen-
dations, the school board "substantially rejected" the report and ordered
that nine of the books be removed from all school libraries in the dis-
trict.' 8 2 One book was returned to the high school library without re-
striction, and the other was returned to the library to be made available
to students only with parental approval. 8 3 No reasons were given by the
school board as to why the committee's recommendations were
rejected.' 8 4
Suit was filed by several students challenging the removal of the
books. 18 5 They alleged that the decision of the school board members
was taken "because particular passages in the books offended their social,
political and moral tastes and not because the books, taken as a whole,
were lacking in educational value."' 8 6 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the school board, holding that:
[T]he board acted not on religious principles but on its conserva-
tive educational philosophy, and on its belief that the nine books
removed from the school library and curriculum were irrelevant,
vulgar, immoral, and in bad taste, making them educationally un-
suitable for the district's junior and senior high school students.' 8 7
On appeal, the Second Circuit "viewed the case as turning on the
contested factual issue of whether [the school board's] removal decision
was motivated by a justifiable desire to remove books containing vulgari-
ties and sexual explicitness, or rather by an impermissible desire to sup-
press ideas."' 8 Therefore the court of appeals reversed the district court
judgment and remanded the case for trial, allowing the students the op-
179. Id. at 857.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 858. The committee could not agree on two books and took no position on the
final book because not all committee members had read it. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 858-59.
187. Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
188. 457 U.S. at 861 (citing Pico, 638 F.2d 404, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J.,
concurring)).
[Vol. 12:1
portunity to prove unconstitutional motivation.189 The Supreme Court
affirmed.' 90
B. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion in Pico was written by Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Justice Blackmun joined in part of the
plurality opinion and wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice White
also wrote a separate concurring opinion, while the remaining four Jus-
tices dissented.
Justice Brennan was careful to limit the effect of the holding by not-
ing what the Court did not decide:
Respondents do not seek . . . to impose limitations upon their
school board's discretion to prescribe the curricula of the Island
Trees schools. . . . Furthermore, . . . the action before us does
not involve the acquisition of books. . . . Rather, the only action
challenged in this case is the removal from school libraries of books
originally placed there by school authorities .... 191
Justice Brennan recognized the importance of the inculcative func-
tion of public education. After quoting from Ambach v. Norwick,'92 he
recognized that "local school boards must be permitted 'to establish and
apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values,'
and that 'there is a legitimate and substantial community interest in pro-
moting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral,
or political.' "193
The authority of school officials to educate the nation's youth and to
prepare them for adulthood is, however, subject to constitutional limita-
tions. Justice Brennan noted the "role of the First Amendment . . . in
affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of
information and ideas." 194 This role applies also to public schools.
"[J]ust as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to exer-
cise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner, such
access prepares students for active and effective participation in the plu-
ralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon be adult mem-
bers."' 95 While conceding that "First Amendment rights accorded to
students must be construed 'in light of the special characteristics of the
189. 457 U.S. at 860.
190. Id. at 875.
191. Id. at 862 (emphasis original).
192. 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979). See also supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
193. 457 U.S. at 864 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10).
194. 457 U.S. at 866 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
195. 457 U.S. at 868.
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school environment,' "196 Justice Brennan noted that "the special charac-
teristics of the school library make that environment especially appropri-
ate for the recognition of the First Amendment rights of students." 197
Noting that libraries are devoted in part to the pursuit of knowledge, and
that students are free to inquire into areas not covered by the prescribed
curriculum, 198 Justice Brennan apparently concluded that the inculcative
function of public school education was not involved in this case. Thus,
while school authorities may well claim
absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their
duty to inculcate community values, . . . that duty is misplaced
where, as here, they attempt to extend their claim of absolute dis-
cretion beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom, into
the school library and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there
holds sway. 199
Justice Brennan suggested a distinction between the public school class-
room and the public school library, but this distinction is tenuous. 200
While rejecting the school board's claim of absolute discretion to
remove books from public school libraries, Justice Brennan admitted that
"local school boards have a substantial legitimate role to play in the de-
termination of school library content."' 2 1 The issue to him became the
need to reconcile school board authority with First Amendment limita-
tions on that authority. Justice Brennan feared that school board author-
ity would be exercised in such a way as to indoctrinate students in
matters of politics, religion, and other areas.20 2 "[S]tudents may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses
to communicate. ' '20 3 Even in the context of public education, "no offi-
cial, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, or other matters of opinion. '2 4 Finally, Justice Brennan
reiterated that "the First Amendment . . .does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 2 5
Applying this latter principle to the Pico case, he stated that the
"significant discretion" of school boards "to determine the content of
196. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
197. 457 U.S. at 868 (emphasis original).
198. Id. at 869.
199. Id. (emphasis original).
200. See infra text accompanying notes 284-90.
201. 457 U.S. at 869.
202. Id. at 870-71.
203. Id. at 868 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
204. 457 U.S. at 870 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
205. 457 U.S. at 870 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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their school libraries. . . may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or
political manner. '  He then proceeded to give some examples of "nar-
rowly partisan or political" removals of books from school libraries:
If a Democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation,
ordered the removal of all books written by or in favor of Republi-
cans, few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional
rights of the students denied access to those books. The same con-
clusion would surely apply if an all-white school board, motivated
by racial animus, decided to remove all books authored by blacks
or advocating racial equality and integration.2" 7
Because Justice Brennan recognized that some library book remov-
als would be valid, it was necessary for him to devise a mode of inquiry
that would permit the Court to make a sensitive judgment on the re-
moval issue. In his view, the judgment turned on the motivation underly-
ing school board actions. If the school officials "intended by their
removal decision to deny [students] access to ideas with which [the
school officials] disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in [the
removal] decision, then [the school officials] have exercised their discre-
tion in violation of the Constitution."208 Justice Brennan also noted that
"[b]y 'decisive factor' we mean a 'substantial factor' in the absence of
which the opposite decision would have been reached."20 9 In focusing
upon motivation, he seemed to admit that removal decisions, even if
based on the content of the books, would be permissible absent an intent
to limit student access to ideas disapproved by school officials. In partic-
ular, he agreed with the concession of the students that removal of "per-
vasively vulgar" books or books lacking "educational suitability" would
have been "perfectly permissible."21 These latter motivations "would
not carry the danger of an official suppression of ideas" '211 and would not,
presumably, violate the First Amendment rights of students.
C. The Concurring Opinions
Justices Blackmun and White both wrote separate concurring opin-
ions, which provided the critical votes to affirm the judgment of the court
of appeals.21 2 Not only were the votes of Justices Blackmun and White
decisive, but their opinions were narrower in scope than the plurality
opinion. Therefore, their opinions controlled.
206. 457 U.S. at 870.
207. Id. at 870-71.
208. Id. at 871 (emphasis original).
209. Id. at 871 n.22. See also infra note 386 and accompanying text.
210. 457 U.S. at 871.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 875, 883.
Fall 1984]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun noted "two competing prin-
ciples of constitutional stature" present in the case.21 The first principle
involved the role of public education "in the preparation of individuals
for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on
which our society rests. ' 214 Recognizing the "essential socializing func-
tion" of public schools, Justice Blackmun stated that school officials are
empowered "to promote civic virtues" and to "inculcat[e] fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system." '215
On the other hand, Justice Blackmun stated that "schools and
school boards must operate within the confines of the First Amend-
ment. 21 6 He reiterated the principle that the "imposition of 'ideological
discipline' [is] not a proper undertaking for school authorities., 217
"[S]chool officials may seek to instill certain values 'by persuasion and
example,' or by choice of emphasis. That sort of positive educational
action, however, is the converse of an intentional attempt to shield stu-
dents from certain ideas that officials find politically distasteful. 21 1
After noting the conflict between these constitutional principles, and
referring to the general First Amendment rule that often proscribes con-
tent-based regulations of speech,21 9 Justice Blackmun announced what
he believed should be the controlling principle: "[T]he State may not
suppress exposure to ideas-for the sole purpose of suppressing exposure
to those ideas-absent sufficiently compelling reasons. '220 Unlike Justice
Brennan, however, Justice Blackmun rejected the notion that public
school students have a First Amendment right to receive information.
"[T]he principle involved here is both narrower and more basic than the
'right to receive information' identified by the plurality. I do not suggest
that the State has any affirmative obligation to provide students with
information or ideas .... ",221 To Justice Blackmun, it is "state dis-
crimination between ideas" that is prohibited.222 Furthermore, such dis-
crimination between ideas is prohibited only when certain motives for
that discrimination are present: "[T]he State may not act to deny access
213. Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
214. Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)). See also supra text accom-
panying notes 14-19.
215. 457 U.S. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80).
216. 457 U.S. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 877 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). See also supra text accompanying notes
40-64, 75-76.
218. 457 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640).
219. See supra note 52.
220. 457 U.S. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis original).
221. Id. at 878.
222. Id. at 878-79 (emphasis ofiginal).
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to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea for parti-
san or political reasons." '223 As Justice Blackmun stated in a footnote,
his focus differs significantly from that of Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion. "[W]hile the plurality focuses on the failure to provide informa-
tion, I find crucial the State's decision to single out an idea for disap-
proval and then deny access to it."
2 24
According to Justice Blackmun, "school officials may not remove
books for the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social
perspectives discussed in them, when that action is motivated simply by
the officials' disapproval of the ideas involved. 22 5 For a removal deci-
sion to be valid, the school board must have "had something in mind in
addition to the suppression of partisan or political views it did not
share." 22
6
Justice Blackmun then proceeded to describe several constitution-
ally permissible purposes for removing books from public school librar-
ies. "School officials must be able to choose one book over another...
when the first book is deemed more relevant to the curriculum, or better
written, or when one of a host of other politically neutral reasons is pres-
ent."1227 He also noted that the First Amendment would not prohibit
school authorities from refusing "to make a book available to students
because it contains offensive language, . . . or because it is psychologi-
cally or intellectually inappropriate for the age group, or even, perhaps,
because the ideas it advances are 'manifestly inimical to the public wel-
fare.' "228 School authorities "must have the authority to make educa-
tionally appropriate choices in designing a curriculum" 229 and "may seek
to instill certain values 'by persuasion and example,' . . . or by choice of
emphasis. That sort of positive educational action, however, is the con-
verse of an intentional attempt to shield students from certain ideas that
officials find politically distasteful."2 ' Thus, while Justice Blackmun's
focus differed from the plurality's, he agreed that the constitutional issue
turned on the motivation of those who decided to remove the books from
the Island Trees District school libraries.231
223. Id. at 879.
224. Id. at 879 n.2.
225. Id. at 879-80 (emphasis original).
226. Id. at 880.
227. Id.
228. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)).
229. 457 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
230. Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640).
231. In addition to addressing the issue of motivation in his separate concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun also joined Justice Brennan's plurality opinion on this point. 457 U.S. at
879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Justice White, who concurred in the judgment, addressed only the
procedural issue.232 He stated that the summary judgment was improper
since a material issue of fact needed to be resolved.233 He declined to
discuss the substantive constitutional issues, believing that to do so was
both unnecessary and premature in the absence of a concrete factual rec-
ord.234 By concurring in the judgment to remand, however, Justice
White implicitly acknowledged that the school board's motivation would
be determinative of the constitutional question. The only disputed issue
of fact was the motivation of the school board. Had Justice White not
believed that the board's motivation was significant-if not determina-
tive-of the constitutional issue, he would have concluded that the dis-
puted issue of fact was not material and that summary judgment was
appropriate.
D. The Dissenting Opinions
Several dissents were registered in Pico. Chief Justice Burger's dis-
sent,235 in which Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined, criti-
cized the plurality opinion on several counts. First, the Chief Justice
denied that the First Amendment creates any right of student access to
books in a public school. While agreeing that there is a First Amend-
ment right to receive ideas, he stated that "[ilt does not follow. . . that a
school board must affirmatively aid the speaker in its communication
with the recipient." '236 He thus rejected the suggestion that "if a writer
has something to say, the government through its schools must be the
courier. ' '2 3
7
Second, Chief Justice Burger thought that the plurality opinion did
not sufficiently recognize either the importance of the inculcative func-
tion of public education or the necessity for content-based regulations to
serve that function. "If. . . schools may legitimately be used as vehicles
for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system,'. . . school authorities must have broad dis-
cretion to fulfill that obligation."23 He added that these "fundamental
values" cannot "be inculcated except by having school boards make con-
tent-based decisions about the appropriateness of retaining materials in
232. 457 U.S. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 883.
234. Id. at 884.
235. Id. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 887.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 889 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
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the school library and curriculum. 2 39 Chief Justice Burger thus admit-
ted that such decisions are inevitably content-based.24 As he pointed
out, even Justice Brennan's rationale permits content-based decisions.241
While Justice Brennan would not permit school authorities to remove
library books based upon narrow partisan or political considerations, he
did concede that school authorities could consider factors such as perva-
sive vulgarity and educational suitability in determining which books to
remove.242 To the Chief Justice, however, "educational suitability" is a
"standardless phrase" that provides no guidance to school authorities or
to the courts.24 3 He concluded that such decisions should be made by
elected local school boards which then select the administrators and
teachers who can best decide which books belong in public school librar-
ies. 2 "€ Even if those decisions are content-based, they are justified by the
inculcative role of public education and the necessity for school officials
to have the authority to select the values to be inculcated.
The Chief Justice was not concerned that local school boards might
act irresponsibly in choosing how to best inculcate community values.
Noting that the tradition of "local control of education involves democ-
racy in a microcosm," he stated that in most school districts "'parents
have a large voice in running the school. . . . [A] school board is not a
giant bureaucracy far removed from accountability for its actions; it is
truly 'of the people and by the people.' ",245 If parents believe that the
school board has erred in setting educational policy, they can easily cor-
rect the error by resorting to the ballot box. 2 4 6 In this way parents en-
sure that local school board members reflect the values of the community
that elects them.
Finally, Chief Justice Burger rejected Justice Brennan's distinction
between libraries and classrooms. If courts concern themselves with
school board actions that cast a "pall of orthodoxy" 247 over public edu-
cation or carry the risk of "official suppression"248 of ideas, certainly this
concern applies even more to the classroom than it does to the library.
239. 457 U.S. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 890.
242. Id. at 871 (plurality opinion).
243. Id. at 890 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 890-91.
245. Id. at 891 (emphasis original).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 892 (quoting 457 U.S. at 870 (plurality opinion), which in turn quoted Keyi-
shian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
248. 457 U.S. at 892 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 457 U.S. at 871 (plurality
opinion)).
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While reading library books usually remains optional for students, read-
ing prescribed texts is mandatory. Thus, reasoned the Chief Justice,
school board control over classroom materials carries an even greater
risk of casting a "pall of orthodoxy" over the educational process. 24 9
"Similarly, a decision to eliminate certain material from the curriculum,
history for example, would carry an equal-probably greater-prospect
of 'official suppression.' "250
In a brief dissent, Justice Powell noted a contradiction in the plural-
ity opinion. 251 First, he referred to Justice Brennan's recognition of the
Ambach v. Norwick25 2 principle that by inculcating fundamental values
of our democratic system, schools play a vital role in preparing young
people to be effective participants in that system. 3 However, "when a
school board . . . takes its responsibilities seriously and seeks to decide
what the fundamental values are that should be imparted, the plurality
finds a constitutional violation. '254 Justice Powell interpreted the plural-
ity opinion to mean that a "school board's attempt to instill in its stu-
dents the ideas and values on which a democratic system depends is
viewed as an impermissible suppression of other ideas and values on
which other systems of government and other societies thrive. '215 Jus-
tice Powell "would not require a school board to promote ideas and val-
ues repugnant to a democratic society or to teach such values to
children. 256
In a separate dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist rejected the plurality's argument that
public school students have a First Amendment right of access to ideas in
the public school.257 Referring to the public school environment, he ar-
gued that the plurality failed "to explain the constitutional or logical un-
derpinnings of a right to hear ideas in a place where no speaker has the
right to express them." '258 Furthermore, "the denial of access to ideas
inhibits one's own acquisition of knowledge only when that denial is rela-
tively complete."25 9 But here, those ideas are readily available from
249. 457 U.S. at 892 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 892-93.
251. Id. at 893 (Powell, J., dissenting).
252. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
253. 457 U.S. at 896 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing 457 U.S. at 864 (plurality opinion)).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 897 (emphasis original).
257. Id. at 904 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 912.
259. Id. at 913.
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other sources,260 and therefore "the benefits to be gained from exposure
to those ideas have not been foreclosed by the State.
261
Crucial to Justice Rehnquist's argument was the distinction he drew
between the state as an educator and the state as a sovereign.262 He con-
ceded that a town council, acting as a sovereign, could not prohibit pri-
vate booksellers within the town from selling the books in question.263
On the other hand, when the state "acts as an educator, at least at the
elementary and secondary school level, the government is engaged in in-
culcating social values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young
people." 2" In making decisions with regard to curriculum changes,
book purchases, and teacher employment, school board members "will
act on the basis of their own personal or moral values, will attempt to
mirror those of the community, or will abdicate the making of such deci-
sions to so-called 'experts.' ",265 Thus "it is 'permissible and appropriate
for local [school] boards to make educational decisions based upon their
personal social, political and moral views.' ,266
Justice Rehnquist also expressed his belief that the right of access
rationale advanced by the plurality opinion conflicted with its acceptance
of the inculcative function of public school education:
Education consists of the selective presentation and explana-
tion of ideas. The effective acquisition of knowledge depends upon
an orderly exposure to relevant information. Nowhere is this more
true than in elementary and secondary schools, where, unlike the
broad ranging inquiry available to university students, the courses
taught are those thought most relevant to the young students' indi-
vidual development. Of necessity, elementary and secondary edu-
cators must separate the relevant from the irrelevant, the
appropriate from the inappropriate. Determining what informa-
tion not to present to the students is often as important as identify-
ing relevant material. This winnowing process necessarily leaves
much information to be discovered by students at another time or
in another place, and is fundamentally inconsistent with any con-
stitutionally required eclecticism in public education.267
This "winnowing process" applies not only in matters of curriculum
choice and classroom teaching, but also in the public school library.
260. Other sources include public libraries, university libraries, and bookstores. Id. at 915.
261. Id. at 913.
262. Id. at 908-09.
263. Id. at 908.
264. Id. at 909.
265. Id.
266. Id. (quoting Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th
Cir. 1980)).
267. 457 U.S. at 914 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
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Noting that "elementary and secondary schools are inculcative in na-
ture," Justice Rehnquist stated that their libraries "serve as supplements
to this inculcative role., 26 8 Furthermore, he distinguished university and
public libraries from elementary and secondary school libraries, stating
that the latter "are not designed for freewheeling inquiry; they are tai-
lored, as the public school curriculum is tailored, to the teaching of basic
skills and ideas. '269 Justice Rehnquist concluded, "the nature of [public]
school libraries" cannot be relied on "to escape the fact that the First
Amendment right to receive information simply has no application to the
one public institution which, by its very nature, is a place for the selective
conveyance of ideas."270
E. Summary
The Supreme Court was sharply divided in Pico, and the diversity of
the views expressed in its several opinions obscures the precedential value
of the case. Moreover, the decision was limited to the narrow issue of the
constitutional authority of public school officials to remove books from
the school library. Nevertheless, the next section will apply the princi-
ples enunciated in Pico to situations that arise in public elementary and
secondary school classrooms.
IV. A Proposed Model of Analysis for Free Speech in the
Public School Classroom
This final section proposes and explains an analytic model to use in
resolving issues concerning First Amendment rights of students in the
public school classroom. This model strongly supports the inculcative
function of public school education and rejects attempts to convert the
classroom into a marketplace of ideas where students have a right of
access to information of their choice. It wholly supports, however, the
First Amendment's proscription of narrow political, partisan, and reli-
gious indoctrination. This model provides a basis on which to distin-
guish between permissible value inculcation and impermissible
indoctrination and describes the appropriate role of the courts in review-
ing questioned decisions of state and school officials.
268. Id. at 915.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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A. There Is No Right of Access to Information in the Public School
Classroom
In his attempt in Pico to justify his conclusion that the First Amend-
ment guarantees a right of access to ideas and information, Justice Bren-
nan advanced two arguments. First, he contended that "the right to
receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender's First Amendment
right to send them . ,.271 Second, and "[m]ore importantly, the right
to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exer-
cise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom." '272 Despite
these two arguments, Justice Brennan's contention is untenable. Not
only is he unclear on what he means by a right of access, but he also fails
to explain the source of this right. Several Supreme Court cases cited by
Justice Brennan hold that the government cannot significantly interfere
with a person's right to receive information.273 Yet, none of them sup-
ports his contention that students have a right of access to information
and ideas in the public school or that public schools have the affirmative
constitutional duty to provide requested information. A review of the
cases cited reveals that Justice Brennan created a new right without ad-
mitting it.
One of the earliest cases that mentioned the right to receive ideas
was Martin v. City of Struthers.2 74 In Martin, the Supreme Court struck
down a municipal ordinance that prohibited door-to-door distribution of
handbills, including religious pamphlets.275 Noting that the prohibition
applied even where occupants were willing to be summoned to the door
and to receive the proffered information, the Court stated in dicta that
"[tihe right of freedom of speech and press. . . embraces the right to
distribute literature . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive
it." 2 76
Several other Supreme Court cases decided between 1965 and 1974
also alluded to the right to receive ideas. 277 However, it was not until
271. 457 U.S. at 867 (plurality opinion) (emphasis original).
272. Id. (emphasis original).
273. See infra notes 274-80 and accompanying text.
274. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
275. Id. at 142. The ordinance provided:
It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements
to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or
inmates of any residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills,
circulars or other advertisements they or any person with them may be distributing.
Id.
276. Id. at 143.
277. See, ag., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (striking down regulations re-
garding the censorship of prisoners' mail); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (up-
holding the plenary power of the federal government to exclude an alien who was an advocate
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1976, with its decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,278 that the Supreme Court expressly
recognized the right to receive ideas. In that case, the Court struck down
a Virginia statute that prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising
the retail prices of prescription drugs.2 79 According to the Court, not
only does the advertiser have a First Amendment right to disseminate
commercial speech by means of advertising, but the consumer has "a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising." 8'
None of the cases cited resembled Pico. They dealt with the right of
a willing recipient to receive information, and the right of a willing dis-
tributor to disseminate information, free from unwarranted governmen-
tal interference. The Court never discussed the right of a willing
recipient to receive information from an unwilling distributor. Con-
versely, the students in Pico demanded the right to read certain books in
the possession of school officials, 281 thereby insisting that they had a right
to receive ideas and information from a distributor who was not willing
to disseminate it.
Thus, Justice Brennan appears to have created a new and broad
right of public school students to receive ideas and beliefs that they insist
upon receiving, even if a court must compel the state through its local
schools to disseminate the desired information. Not only is such a right
without precedent, but also it appears to have no principled limits. Jus-
tice Brennan attempted to narrow the scope of this new right by stating
that it applied only in the context of the removal of books from school
libraries and not to the acquisition of library books or to curriculum deci-
sions.2 82 His distinction, however, is wholly unconvincing. If students
have a right of access to books of their choice, then it should not matter
of world communism, in spite of objections of those who desired his entry so that they could
communicate personally with him and engage in an academic exchange); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that persons have the right to possess obscene material in the
privacy of the home free from government intrusion); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301 (1965) (striking down a federal statute permitting the Postmaster General to deliver "com-
munist political propaganda" to the addressee only if the addressee affirmatively requested in
writing that it be delivered to him).
278. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
279. Act of Apr. 5, 1968, ch. 803, 1968 Va. Acts 1419 (current version as amended at VA.
CODE § 54-524.35 (1982)), provided in pertinent part:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who . . . (3)
issues, publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner what-
soever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for profes-
sional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be
dispensed only by prescription.
280. 425 U.S. at 757.
281. Pico, 457 U.S. at 859 (plurality opinion).
282. Id. at 862.
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whether a school board's decision to deny that access comes before or
after its acquisition by a school librarian.283 No constitutional principle
justifies denying students in one school district access to a book because
school board members read and rejected it prior to its purchase, while
granting students in an adjacent district a constitutional right of access to
that same book because its board rejected it only after it had been
purchased and become the object of parental or community complaints.
Justice Brennan's error in propounding the existence of a right of
access developed because he incorrectly perceived the function of a pub-
lic school library.284 Rather than viewing it as an adjunct to the class-
room, designed to serve the inculcative function, Justice Brennan viewed
the school library as he did a public library or university library-as a
place devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and to the freedom of wide-
ranging inquiry and intellectual exploration.285 Were his perception of
the school library accurate, Justice Brennan might have correctly argued
for a right of access. It is at least debatable that such a right of access
exists for public libraries and even perhaps for libraries of public univer-
sities.286 Justice Brennan's view of the public elementary and secondary
school library, however, defies reality. Few school districts have the
monetary or physical resources to create a library that serves the role
favored by Justice Brennan. As a matter of economic necessity and edu-
cational policy, most public school libraries serve the more limited func-
tion described by Justice Rehnquist.287
283. Id. at 892 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 916-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
284. Although Justice Brennan conceded the importance of the inculcative function of
public education, 457 U.S. at 864 (plurality opinion), he failed to recognize that school librar-
ies as well as classrooms can be used to fulfill this function. Constitutional limitations on the
inculcative function may preclude school officials from engaging in intentional, purposeful sup-
pression of partisan or political views merely because they disapprove of those ideas. See infra
text accompanying notes 308-14. However, a lack of authority to indoctrinate students in nar-
row, political, partisan, or religious views is not the same as requiring school officials, through
the creation of a right of access, to "promote ideas and values [that are] repugnant to a demo-
cratic society" and that are inconsistent with the values sought to be inculcated by the public
schools. 457 U.S. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting). As Justice Rehnquist noted in his Pico dis-
sent, the inculcative function of public education not only requires school officials to decide
what information is going to be presented to students, but also requires them to decide what
information is not going to be presented to students. Id. at 914 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). If
the public school library is to serve the inculcative function, and if its purpose is to support this
function in the classroom, then the library is not a marketplace of ideas to which students have
a right of access.
285. Id. at 868-69 (plurality opinion).
286. Justice Rehnquist, who viewed the elementary and secondary school library as incul-
cative in nature, conceded that public and university libraries are "designed for freewheeling
inquiry." Id. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Therefore, even he may agree that there is
some right of access to public and university libraries.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 268-70; see also supra note 284.
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Even if Justice Brennan were correct in finding a right of access to
public school libraries, he conceded that this right cannot extend to the
public school classroom. 288 However, he offered no principled basis on
which to distinguish the classroom from the library. Were students to
have a true right of access to ideas and beliefs, coupled with the right to
compel schools to distribute that information, reason would dictate that
this right apply equally in the classroom and in the library.289 If students
have a right of access to certain books in the school library, it follows
that they also have a right of access to textbooks and ideas in the class-
room. The only possible distinction between the library and the class-
room is that only the latter serves the inculcative function of public
education while the former does not. The public elementary and secon-
dary school library, however, exists primarily for inculcative purposes,
and is tailored to supplement curriculum decisions and classroom educa-
tion.2 90 More fundamentally, Justice Brennan failed to explain why,
even if the classroom/library distinction is valid, the state's interest in
engaging in the inculcative function in the classroom outweighs the stu-
dent's right of access to ideas and beliefs in the classroom.2 91
In spite of this failure, there is little doubt that a right of access
conflicts with the inculcative function. Unless courts are willing to re-
view curriculum decisions systematically, school officials have virtually
uncontrolled discretion to determine the general curriculum and to de-
termine the content of individual courses. These decisions inevitably
provide access to some ideas and beliefs while denying access to others.
A decision to eliminate classical languages from the curriculum denies
288. 457 U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion).
289. Id. at 892-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 914-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
also supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 285-86.
291. 457 U.S. at 581. Justice Brennan could have provided a plausible explanation. In
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment mandates a public right of access to criminal trials. Simply stated, this right
cannot be impaired by closing the trial to the public and press absent an overriding govern-
mental interest. Id. at 580-81. In a well-reasoned concurring opinion, Justice Brennan ex-
plained that the public right of access to information in the hands of the government depends
in part on the importance of access to the governmental process at issue. Ard. at 589 (Brennan,
J., concurring). Because "[c]losed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which
in turn spawns disrespect for law," the public's right of access to the criminal trial is important
to the criminal justice system. Id. at 595. Similarly, were Justice Brennan correct in his as-
sumption that the public school library serves the function of permitting the pursuit of knowl-
edge, wide-ranging inquiry, and intellectual exploration, then a public right of access would be
important in terms of the process itself. Conversely, just as a right of access is not important
to, and indeed would defeat, the function of jury deliberations which are held in secrecy, a
right of access is not important to and would defeat the inculcative function of the educational
process in the classroom.
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access to information. A decision not to add a course in Asian history
restricts the free flow of information. These content-based decisions pre-
sumably represent an informed decision that some types of information
are more valuable than others. Such decisions are commonplace, and the
authority of school officials to make them is almost universally accepted.
Some critics of the decision may disagree because of educational con-
cerns, but rarely will they argue that a constitutional right has been
violated.
Furthermore, the way a teacher conducts a class necessitates numer-
ous content-based decisions that deny access to ideas and beliefs. School
officials and teachers must have the ability to control classroom activities
to accomplish the varied educational goals of the school and the commu-
nity, including the goal of value inculcation. "[U]ninhibited, robust, and
wideopen" debate2 92 on public and other issues will defeat these goals in
many instances. Discussion must be guided, limited to the subject matter
at hand, and even prohibited where necessary for the efficient operation
of the classroom. Only in this way can educational goals and the inculca-
tive function of public education be served effectively.
Additional factors militate against a right of access to a marketplace
of ideas in the public school classroom. First, elementary and secondary
public school students are minors, often lacking the capacity for individ-
ual free choice.293 It is proper to restrict the access of minor public
school students to information, not only to provide for the well-being of
the students but also to fulfill the inculcative function of public educa-
tion. If society expects its schools to train and prepare students to as-
sume the duties of citizenship, it must give school officials the necessary
authority to make the decisions that enable them to perform this tremen-
dous responsibility. Democratically accountable school boards should
have the authority to chart the educational path that our schools follow.
In turn, school boards should be permitted to delegate the authority to
make educational decisions to professional administrators and teachers.
Second, the captive audience rationale affords no support for a right
of access to information in public school classrooms. Although First
Amendment and privacy interests often afford individuals the right to be
free from being part of a captive audience,294 this rationale is inapplicable
to the inherently coercive environment of a public school classroom. 295
Not only do elementary and secondary students lack the full capacity for
292. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 165-75.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 111-21.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
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individual choice, but they are also part of a captive audience by neces-
sity. The premise of compulsory school attendance laws is that children
can be compelled to attend school and to study. Far from being free to
reject ideas and information, they can be compelled to read, see, hear,
study, and learn those values and bodies of knowledge prescribed by the
community through its school boards and professional educators. To as-
sert a right of access to information and ideas of the students' own choice
is to deny the validity of compulsory education laws.2 96
Finally, the reality of limited resources for public elementary and
secondary education must be faced. Given the number of hours in the
school day, and the number of weeks and months in the school year, it is
obvious that the amount of time available for education is not unlim-
ited.297 Competing demands for scarce time often become intense and
cannot easily be satisfied. Monetary resources of public schools are also
extremely limited.2 98 Most school districts lack the financial resources to
provide the best education possible, or even the quality of education that
school boards and professional educbi:3 .' would prefer to offer. In this
reality of limited time and limited money, decisions allocating resources
must be made. Someone must be authorized to choose among competing
demands for time in the classroom, space in the curriculum, and money
for more teachers, instructional material, physical facilities, and support
personnel. Were there a true right of access to ideas and information of
the students' choice, it would be the students who, by insisting upon this
right, would determine the allocation of scarce time and fiscal resources.
Not only would the inculcative function of education be impaired, but
what remained would be an educational mish-mash, a "cacaphony of
competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably
296. See supra note 33.
297. It is typical in public schools in the United States for students to attend school for six
hours per day for 180 days per year. By contrast, in Great Britain and other industrialized
nations, it is common for students to attend school for eight hours per day for 220 days per
year. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK:
THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATION REFORM 21 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COM-
MISSION]. After noting many perceived problems with public education in the United States,
this report recommended that state legislatures and local school boards "should strongly con-
sider 7-hour school days as well as a 200- to 220-day school year." Id. at 29.
298. S. GOLDSTEIN & E. GEE, supra note 33, at 9. Another major recommendation of the
National Commission on Excellence in Education was a call to citizens to provide the degree
of financial support necessary to achieve excellence in public education. NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION, supra note 297, at 32. A major source of funding for public schools is local property tax
revenue, which is tied directly to the value of property within a district as well as to the tax
rate ("millage"). Consequently, the per pupil expenditures in some districts far exceed those of
others. This method of funding public schools was upheld in San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Rather than students, local school officials, both the democratically
accountable school boards and the professional educators, should be em-
powered to allocate scarce time, money, and other resources. Justice
Blackmun expressed this view when he noted two reasons why it was
"difficult to see the First Amendment . . .playing a role in a school's
choice of curriculum." 3" First, recognizing the limited time and finite
resources available for public education, he stated that public school offi-
cials must "make sensitive choices between subjects to be offered and
competing areas of academic emphasis; subjects generally are excluded
simply because school officials have chosen to devote their resources to
one rather than to another subject." '' Such choices, in his view, do not
violate the First Amendment. Second, he noted that "the Court has rec-
ognized that students' First Amendment rights in most cases must give
way if they interfere 'with the schools' work or [with] the rights of other
students to be secure and to be let alone.' ,3o2 This interference "will rise
to intolerable levels if public participation in the management of the cur-
riculum becomes commonplace."3 °3 Conversely, "library books on a
shelf intrude not at all on the daily operation of a school." 3" Thus Jus-
tice Blackmun, like Justice Brennan, limited the scope of his Pico opinion
to the question of public school libraries. By expressly disavowing any
relevance of First Amendment principles to curriculum decisions, how-
ever, he departed from the opinion of Justice Brennan, who left this issue
open.3" 5 By this disavowal, any potential majority of Supreme Court
Justices willing to intervene in curricular decisions has evaporated be-
cause the four dissenting Justices indicated similar views on curricular
matters.3 °6
Although a strong case can be made that courts should never inter-
fere with curricular and instructional choices of public school officials,
such a rule cannot be cast in absolute terms. Courts should be prepared
to intervene, but only in those rare instances when decisions of state and
school officials are based upon narrow political, partisan, or religious
considerations. Otherwise, curriculum choices are entitled to maximum
299. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
300. Pico, 457 U.S. at 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)).
303. 457 U.S. at 878 n.1.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 861-62 (plurality opinion).
306. Id. at 889-92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 893-94 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at
909, 914, 918, 921 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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deference by the courts, applying the traditional substantive due process
"rational nexus" standard of judicial review.30 7
B. Narrow Political, Partisan, or Religious Indoctrination in Public
School Violates the First Amendment
This Article has maintained that, given the importance of value in-
culcation, public elementary and secondary school students have no con-
stitutionally based right of access to information in the classroom.30 8
However, it also recognizes that value inculcation cannot be so narrow as
to result in political, partisan, or religious indoctrination.0 9 In his plu-
rality opinion in Pico, Justice Brennan stated that the First Amendment
would be violated by politically motivated decisions of a Democratic
school board to remove "books written by or in favor of Republicans,,
310
and by racially motivated decisions of an all-white school board to re-
move "books authored by blacks or advocating racial equality and inte-
gration."31  Justice Blackmun agreed;312 and even dissenting Justice
Rehnquist conceded this point.313 It appears that at least seven Justices
are willing to distinguish between permissible value inculcation in public
education and impermissible narrow political, partisan, and religious in-
doctrination. Yet none of the Justices suggested a principled basis on
which to make the distinction.31 4
307. This standard ofjudicial review has its origins in the famous dissent of Justice Holmes
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In his view, a court
should hold a statute unconstitutional only if "a rational and fair man necessarily would admit
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law." Id. at 76. This standard of review presently is
utilized in cases involving economic and social legislation. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955). The standard is referred to in various terms: "rational basis" (United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)); "rational relation" (Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978)); "debatable issue" (Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952)); or simply "rational way" (Lee Optical,
348 U.S. at 488)). For a specific application of this standard of review to curricular decisions
of school officials, see infra text accompanying note 372.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 292-303.
309. See generally infra text accompanying notes 320-23.
310. 457 U.S. at 870-71.
311. Id. at 871.
312. Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
313. Id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
314. The seven Justices are: Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens (the Justices of the
plurality opinion); Justice Blackmun (the author of the concurring opinion); and Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell joining Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion. Justice White did
not reach the substantive issues. See supra text accompanying notes 232-34. Justice
O'Connor, who joined the Chief Justice's dissent, also wrote an extremely brief dissent in
which she did not address this issue. 457 U.S. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Given the
procedural context of the case, it was not necessary for either Justice Brennan or Justice Black-
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1. Reconciling the Inculcative Function with the Proscription Against
Narrow Political, Partisan, or Religious Indoctrination
Any attempt to provide a basis on which to distinguish between per-
missible value inculcation and impermissible indoctrination must begin
with a clear understanding of the importance of these competing consti-
tutional values. Courts have long recognized the traditional and critical
importance of the inculcative function of public school education and the
broad discretion conferred on state and school officials to ensure that this
function is performed efficiently.315 The heart of the public educational
process is the transmittal of information, including substantive knowl-
edge, learning skills, and societal values. This process is strictly con-
trolled to serve the inculcative function.
State legislatures and state agencies often fasten minimum educa-
tional standards on local school districts.316 These standards typically
encompass matters such as teacher qualifications, the length of the school
day and school year, curriculum and course offerings, and-occasion-
ally-the content of educational materials. Local school boards, as the
elected representatives of parents and other community residents, typi-
cally impose additional and higher educational standards.317 These
school board decisions usually reflect community values as to what stu-
dents should be taught. In carrying out these decisions, administrators
and teachers often institute plans to integrate curriculum and instruction
to make the twelve years of public education a coherent and comprehen-
mun to provide a principled basis for distinguishing between permissible value inculcation and
impermissible indoctrination. Both of them apparently preferred to withhold any further dis-
cussion of this distinction until the trial court had the opportunity to resolve the factual issue
of the motivation and reasons behind the school board's actions. Justice Rehnquist also did
not suggest a basis on which to distinguish between inculcation and indoctrination. Because
he found that eight of the books were removed due to their profanity and vulgarity, and that
the ninth book "contained nothing that could be considered partisan or political," Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the removal decisions fell well within constitutionally permissible
limits. Id. at 907-08. Consequently, it was not necessary for him to place outer limits on the
authority of school officials.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 7-20.
316. See, eg., N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 27-29 (3d ed. 1971);
S. GOLDSTEIN & E. GEE, supra note 33, at 57; L. PETERSON, R. ROSSMILLER & M. VOLZ,
THE LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION 319-20 (2d ed. 1978); D. SCHIMMEL & L. FIR-
SCHER, THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN THE EDUCATION OF THEIR CHILDREN 75 (1977); Dia-
mond, supra note 1, at 506-07 nn.130-31.
317. See, eg., L. PETERSON, R. ROSSMILLER & M. VOLZ, supra note 316, at 321-34; E.
REUTTER & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 107-14, 116-25 (1970); D.
SCHIMMEL & L. FIRSCHER, supra note 316, at 75; Diamond, supra note 1, at 506-07 nn.130-
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sive whole. 3 8 They then select those textbooks and instructional materi-
als which will best implement their plans. Individual teachers must
adhere to the curriculum and instructional model. Teachers test students
to discover if they have learned the information and skills imparted to
them. Grades and academic achievement depend upon "correct" re-
sponses to test items; responses are "correct" only if they conform to the
views that have been taught. This process is value inculcation at work
and is the reality of contemporary public education.31 9
Although the inculcative function of public education is critically
important, school officials must remain highly sensitive to the dangers of
narrow political, partisan, and religious indoctrination. These dangers
are exacerbated by the status of the students: minors in a captive audi-
ence. School children are "not possessed of that full capacity for individ-
ual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees. ' 320 Lacking the skepticism of college students, public ele-
mentary and secondary students are impressionable and susceptible to
indoctrination. 321 Additionally, public school children cannot decline to
receive disseminated information. Rather, they are compelled to sit in
the classroom and to read, see, hear, study, and learn that which the state
and school officials require.322 Compulsory education presents no consti-
tutional difficulty when its purpose is to inculcate values and to educate
students in order to prepare them to take their place as enlightened citi-
zens in society. Only narrow political, partisan, or religious indoctrina-
tion violates the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court in Pico was sensitive to the dangers of indoctri-
nation. While accepting the inculcative model of public education in the
318. See, e.g., M. ALPREN, THE SUBJECT CURRICULUM GRADES K-12, at 6-7 (1967); Le
Clercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Consumption?, 27 VAND. L.
REV. 209, 235 (1974); Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom: A
Search for Standards, 8 GA. L. REv. 837, 846 (1974).
319. Although the preceding paragraph describes public school education as it exists in this
country, it does not imply that school districts must follow the inculcative model. Neither the
First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision dictates that one educational model
be utilized to the exclusion of any other. Justice Brennan committed this fundamental error in
Pico. He implicitly held that the First Amendment prohibits the inculcative function in the
context of the public school library. He found that the First Amendment guarantees students
a right of access to a marketplace of ideas, yet he did not explain why the First Amendment
permits a public school classroom but not a public school library to be used for inculcative
purposes. But see supra note 291. By permitting school officials to tailor a public school li-
brary for inculcative purposes, the dissenting Justices accepted the reasonableness of the deci-
sion of the Island Trees school officials and deferred to that decision.
320. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
321. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (plurality opinion). See also supra
text accompanying note 84.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
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classroom, the Court nevertheless indicated that it would not tolerate
narrow political, partisan, or religious indoctrination, at least in the pub-
lic school library.323 In suggesting that narrow political, partisan, and
religious indoctrination is prohibited, perhaps the Justices implied that
only narrow indoctrination is prohibited. A narrow construction of the
word "indoctrination" is fully consistent with the inculcative function of
public education.
2. Religious Indoctrination
Although neither the Supreme Court nor the court of appeals in
Pico discussed what religious indoctrination might entail, past cases pro-
vide a sufficient explanation. Particularly helpful are the school prayer
cases, Engel v. Vitale324 and School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp.325 Although both cases were decided on Establishment Clause
grounds,326 a strong argument can be made that the Free Exercise Clause
was also violated 327 despite the contention that the school prayers were
characterized as voluntary. The inherently coercive environment of pub-
lic schools, together with external factors such as peer pressure and the
typical reluctance of a child to be labelled "different," forces children to
participate in "voluntary" school prayer-thus making the activity invol-
untary on their part.3 28 Such coerced religious activity violates the Free
323. Seven Justices indicated that they would not permit the removal of books "written by
or in favor of Republicans" or "authored by blacks or advocating racial equality and integra-
tion." 457 U.S. at 870-71. While these examples may present an extreme case, it may well be
that only such an extreme case would violate the First Amendment. See also supra text ac-
companying notes 309-14.
324. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
325. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
326. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... U." S.
CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause prohibits government from aiding religion. See,
e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
In the school prayer cases, the Court held that religion was aided by a program which consti-
tuted tacit governmental approval of religion.
327. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] ....
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from interfering
with the right of the person to practice his or her faith. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940). There is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause unless a person is coerced to
act or refrain from acting in violation of that person's religious beliefs. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Old Order Amish children compelled to attend public school after
the eighth grade; see supra note 149); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the
denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to
work on Saturday due to her religious beliefs unconstitutionally imposed a significant burden
on freedom of religion by "coercing" her to choose between her religion and the receipt of state
benefits).
328. See, eg., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 287-93 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring), and authorities cited therein.
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Exercise Clause. Additionally, given their subtly coercive nature, school-
sponsored and endorsed prayers constitute vivid examples of the type of
narrow religious indoctrination to which several Justices in Pico alluded.
Conversely, the school prayer cases implicitly affirmed the authority
of school officials to teach ethical and moral values to public school stu-
dents, noting that religious materials might be used as a vehicle for instil-
ling these values. 329 Thus, the Court recognized the inculcative function
of public education and marked a clear distinction between permissible
inculcation of ethical and moral values and impermissible religious in-
doctrination. Although the study of ethical and moral values might in-
volve a study of religious values, the First Amendment is not violated
absent narrow religious indoctrination.330
As the school prayer cases noted, a topic need not be excluded from
the curriculum or from classroom discussion merely because it involves a
study of religious influences. This result is possible only by narrowly
construing the term "religious indoctrination" to mean attempts to pros-
elytize students or to instill them with religious or antireligious beliefs.
3. Political and Partisan Indoctrination
The phrase "narrow political or partisan indoctrination" also should
be strictly construed. Not only would this construction mirror the con-
cerns expressed by a majority of the Justices in Pico,331 but it would also
provide needed recognition to the inculcative function of public educa-
tion. A narrow construction would prohibit school officials from indoc-
trinating students in partisan political ideas and beliefs, yet would permit
them to inculcate students with the general political values that lie at the
heart of representative democracy. A few examples illustrate how
strictly construing "narrow political and partisan indoctrination" helps
distinguish between inculcation and indoctrination.
Discrimination between different and noncompeting subject matter
in the public school curriculum does not offend the First Amendment. 32
Similarly, no constitutional issue arises when school officials require that
one viewpoint be taught to the exclusion of a competing viewpoint, pro-
329. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-25.
330. A study of contemporary moral and ethical values would be incomplete without dis-
cussing whether, and to what extent, those values are tied to religious beliefs. Because "[t]he
history of man is inseparable from the history of religion," Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434
(1962), the study of history dictates a study of religious influences on the march of history.
Ancient and recent events in the Middle East, the Reformation, the English Civil War, and the
settling of the American colonies are but a few examples.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 309-14.
332. See supra text following note 104.
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vided no political, social, or religious considerations are present. For ex-
ample, school officials may decide to replace "new math" with "old
math" or vice versa. Although such a choice is clearly content-based and
reflects a purposeful decision to advocate one particular viewpoint over
another, it does not violate the First Amendment. Since no political,
partisan, or religious considerations are present, most federal courts
probably would refuse to entertain a constitutional challenge to such a
decision.
Somewhat more difficult from a constitutional standpoint are deci-
sions of public school officials that inculcate general political and social
values while winnowing out competing viewpoints. School officials
should be permitted to decide that students be inculcated with funda-
mental political and social values such as religious tolerance, racial
equality, and the merits of representative democracy. The inculcation of
such values does not require that equal time be given to persons, materi-
als or information that advocate religious bigotry, racial prejudice, or
totalitarianism. While such decisions raise issues of constitutional di-
mension,33 they ordinarily can be resolved by narrowly construing the
First Amendment prohibition against political or partisan indoctrination.
Impermissible indoctrination would arise when the inherently coer-
cive nature of the public school classroom is used to compel students to
study, learn, and accept the principles of a particular political party.334
This type of indoctrination treads most heavily on First Amendment
principles without furthering the inculcative function of public
education.
Another example of impermissible political or partisan indoctrina-
tion involves the suppression of views advocating racial equality and inte-
gration.335 This example, however, presents an inherent inconsistency. A
decision of school officials to teach principles of racial equality consti-
tutes permissible value inculcation, while a contrary decision to teach the
competing viewpoint of racial prejudice constitutes impermissible polit-
ical or partisan indoctrination. This apparent inconsistency can be re-
solved only by examining the sources of contemporary political and
social values.
333. Such content-based decisions "inculcate" students in certain political viewpoints and
"suppress" competing viewpoints, but one suspects that most school districts have made these
decisions.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 309-14.
335. Id.
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4. Determining the Source of Fundamental Political and Social Values
Inculcated in Public School Students
The United States Constitution provides the first source of those
fundamental values that public schools may inculcate. The principles of
our democratic form of government pervade the Constitution.336 Reli-
gious tolerance and freedom are deeply imbedded in our constitutional
tradition, 337 as well as principles of racial equality and freedom from ra-
cial discrimination.338 It should be permissible for school officials to
choose to inculcate students in constitutionally recognized fundamental
values while refusing to permit the study of beliefs contrary to those val-
ues. Thus, school officials can decide to inculcate students in the funda-
mental values of religious tolerance, racial equality, and the merits of
democracy while refusing to permit discussions of religious bigotry, ra-
cial prejudice, and totalitarianism.
Admittedly, not all fundamental values that public schools tradi-
tionally impart to students are rooted in constitutional tradition. Many
of these values, however, are imbedded in federal, state, and local laws
which in turn mirror social and moral values of society. Therefore, pub-
lic school officials can inculcate students in such matters as personal hon-
esty and integrity, family life and responsibilities, sexual standards, and
the harmful effects of drug and alcohol abuse. Competing viewpoints
need not receive equal time.
Other values that public schools inculcate are not constitutionally or
legally based. Rather, they are founded on moral and ethical viewpoints.
336. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing for election of members of the House of Representa-
tives); U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, ci. 2-4 (providing for election of the President and Vice Presi-
dent by the Electoral College); U.S. CONST. amend. XII (reforming the procedure of the
Electoral College); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1-2 (providing that no state shall abridge
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States or deny to any person equal protection
of the laws, and further providing for the reduction of representation in the House of Repre-
sentatives if the right to vote is denied to eligible voters); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting
the abridgement of the right to vote on grounds of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude); U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of United States Senators);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (extending the right to vote to women); U.S. CONsT. amend. XXII
(limiting the Presidential term of office); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (permitting voters in the
District of Columbia to vote in Presidential elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibiting
poll taxes as a condition for voting in federal elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (reducing
the voting age to 18 in federal and state elections).
337. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See supra notes 326-27.
338. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (conferring citizenship on persons born in the United States, and prohibiting
states from abridging privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, from depriving
persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and from denying persons equal
protection of the laws); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting abridgement of the right to vote
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude).
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Examples include respect for others, personal hygiene, civic responsibil-
ity, and the work ethic. Because these values are not rooted in the Con-
stitution or in federal, state, or local law, the state's interest in
inculcating these values may be less substantial. Nevertheless, there are
few-if any-First Amendment interests at stake.33 9 Therefore, the in-
culcation of these values ordinarily should be permitted. Pursuant to this
analysis, perhaps the only ideas and beliefs that cannot be imparted with-
out offending the First Amendment are those that are contrary to consti-
tutionally or legally based values.3"
It is possible to distinguish between value inculcation and narrow
political, partisan, and religious indoctrination. By scrutinizing the con-
tent of the imparted information and determining the proximity of the
information to constitutionally or legally based values, it ordinarily can
be determined whether the teaching of the questioned information is in-
culcative or indoctrinative. If the answer is clear, there need be no fur-
ther inquiry. In some cases, however, the answer will not be apparent. In
these instances, it becomes necessary to examine the motivation behind
the decision to impart the challenged information to students.
C. Motivational Inquiry-A Last Resort
1. The Appropriateness of Motivational Inquiry in the Public School
Classroom
In Pico, Justice Brennan indicated that the constitutionality of a
school board's decision to remove books from the school library "de-
pends upon the motivation behind [the school board's] actions. "341
While recognizing that school officials "possess significant discretion to
determine the content of their school libraries," Justice Brennan reiter-
ated that "that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or
political manner., 342 The First Amendment is violated if school officials
"intended by their removal decision to deny [students] access to ideas
with which [the school board] disagreed, and if this intent was the deci-
339. Values such as respect for others and personal hygiene are not likely to implicate First
Amendment interests if the Amendment's scope in the public school context is limited to a
prohibition of narrow political, partisan, and religious indoctrination.
340. As noted previously, examples include religious bigotry, racial prejudice, and an-
tidemocratic beliefs. Narrow political or partisan indoctrination is another example of im-
parting an antidemocratic belief. The effect of indoctrinating students in the principles of a
particular political party is akin to indoctrinating them in the principles of totalitarianism.
The practice of indoctrinating students in the principles of the political party currently in
power is one hallmark of a totalitarian regime.
341. 457 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion).
342. Id. at 870.
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sive factor in [the] decision." '343 Conversely, the students in Pico con-
ceded-and Justice Brennan implicitly agreed-that "unconstitutional
motivation would not be demonstrated if it were shown that [the school
board] had decided to remove the books at issue because those books
were pervasively vulgar" or "if it were demonstrated that the removal
decision was based solely upon the 'educational suitability' of the
books." 3"
Justice Blackmun agreed, stating in concurrence that "school offi-
cials may not remove books for the purpose of restricting access to the
political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when that action
is motivated simply by the officials' disapproval of the ideas involved." '345
For the removal decision to be valid,
the school board must "be able to show that its action was caused
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,"
• . . and that the board had something in mind in addition to the
suppression of partisan or political views it did not share.346
By concurring in the judgment to remand the case for a trial on the
merits, Justice White implicitly acknowledged that a determination of
the school board's motivation would be decisive in resolving the constitu-
tional issue.347
a. Curricular Decisions
Pico dealt with the removal of books from a public school library.
Faced with that issue, a majority of the Justices believed that an inquiry
into the motivation of the school board was required. Motivational in-
quiry will rarely be necessary when scrutinizing curricular and instruc-
tional choices of states and school authorities because the First
Amendment plays little or no part in curricular choices.348 Even when
First Amendment issues are raised, the analysis suggested earlier is likely
to resolve these issues without resorting to a motivational inquiry.349
Nevertheless, an inquiry into the motivation underlying curricular and
instructional decisions may occasionally be necessary.
343. Id. at 871 (emphasis original).
344. Id. (emphasis original).
345. Id. at 879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis original).
346. Id. at 880 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 509 (1969)).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 232-34.
348. 457 U.S. at 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also supra text accompanying
notes 300-03.
349. See supra part B of this section.
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For example, such an inquiry may be required where school officials
decide that a biology course should contain a unit on the theory of evolu-
tion but not one on creationism. Epperson v. Arkansas350 indicated that
the teaching of creationism to the exclusion of evolution would violate
the First Amendment Establishment Clause.35' This practice could also
be held to violate the Free Exercise Clause and the First Amendment's
prohibition against narrow religious indoctrination in public schools. 3
52
While efforts to teach creationism to the exclusion of evolution have
largely disappeared, believers in creationism today advocate a balanced
approach in the teaching of biology. 3  Rather than directly attacking
the teaching of evolution, they urge that equal time be given to the teach-
ing of creationism*.35  This argument is based on the proposition that the
First Amendment converts the public school classroom into a market-
place of ideas in which students have a right of access to information,
ideas, and beliefs. In addition, proponents of a balanced approach argue
that the teaching of evolution to the exclusion of creationism constitutes
narrow antireligious indoctrination.355 Conversely, the overwhelming
opinion of biologists is that this content-based decision to teach evolution
but not creationism reflects sound educational and pedagogical goals. 3 5 6
According to this proposed model, the initial inquiry must deter-
mine the proximity of the information being taught to legitimate societal
values. Admittedly, the theory of evolution is not constitutionally or le-
gally based and does not reflect any ethical, moral, or social value.
350. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 89-104.
351. 393 U.S. at 109.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 324-30.
353. For two analyses of the current attempt by creationists to require a balanced approach
to the teaching of the origins of life, see Le Clercq, supra note 318, at 209; Note, Freedom of
Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515 (1978). The latter sug-
gests that the First Amendment requirement of governmental neutrality in religious matters
necessitates neutralized instruction in the origins of the world and of life. Id. at 550-64. Con-
versely, Le Clercq takes the position that the teaching of creationism, even as part of a bal-
anced approach, violates the Establishment Clause. Le Clercq, supra note 318, at 214-26. This
conclusion follows from his assumption that creationism is a purely religious theory and has
no plausible scientific basis. Id. at 214. However, he concedes that the Free Exercise Clause
rights of students whose religious beliefs are offended by being compelled to receive instruction
in the theory of evolution may necessitate that those students be exempted from compulsory
attendance at classes where the theory of evolution is taught. Id. at 230-32 (citing Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which held that Old Order Amish children could not be
compelled to attend public schools after the eighth grade when objected to on Free Exercise
Clause grounds).
354. Le Clercq, supra note 318, at 210-12, 216; Note, supra note 353, at 550-65.
355. Note, supra note 353, at 536-43.
356. Le Clercq, supra note 318, at 214 (citing Resolution of the Comm'n. on Science Educ.
of the Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Science (Oct. 13, 1972), in THE BIOLOGICAL SCI-
ENCES CURRICULUM STUDY NEWSLETiTER No. 49, at 17 (1972)).
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Rather, the teaching of evolution merely imparts information concerning
a widely accepted scientific theory and does not constitute value inculca-
tion. School officials cannot justify their decision to teach evolution but
not creationism solely by reference to the source of the legitimate societal
value being taught. No such value exists except for the value of im-
parting knowledge. The problem is compounded when one recognizes
that a balanced approach to the teaching of evolution and creationism
arguably is necessary to protect students from narrow antireligious
indoctrination. 5
7
Although the teaching of evolution does not constitute value incul-
cation, it does have the potential of resulting in narrow antireligious in-
doctrination. Consequently, the initial inquiry into the content of the
imparted information and its proximity to legitimate societal values does
not lead to the conclusion that the teaching of evolution constitutes value
inculcation rather than indoctrination. This issue can be resolved only
by a second inquiry that examines the motivation underlying the decision
to teach evolution to the exclusion of creationism. If the decision is
based on sound educational and pedagogical reasons and is supported by
the weight of expert opinion, the decision should be upheld. If, however,
the decision is based on a desire to suppress an unpopular or officially
disfavored religious belief, the decision cannot stand.
b. Decisions Regarding Student Expression in the Classroom
Motivational inquiry may also be necessary in cases concerning
classroom activities of students that are not directly related to the curric-
ulum or teaching methodology: the wearing of political insignia by stu-
dents; 358 profane, vulgar, or sexually explicit comments;359 racial
epithets; 360 and speech by students that school officials neither invite nor
desire. Even in these cases, a utilization of this proposed model will often
357. See supra text accompanying notes 353-55. Justice Black raised precisely this point in
his concurring opinion in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 113 (Black, J., concurring). See
supra text accompanying note 102.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 49-64.
359. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). Although the majority sum-
marly vacated the judgment of a New Jersey court that upheld a conviction for the use of
indecent and offensive language, Justice Powell argued that "the willful use of scurrilous lan-
guage calculated to offend the sensibilities of an unwilling audience" is not protected by the
First Amendment. Id. at 905 (Powell, J., dissenting). Although this view has never been
adopted by the Court, a strong argument can be made that, in the restricted environment of
the public school classroom with a captive audience consisting of minors, such language ought
not to receive any constitutional protection. See also Garvey, Children and the First Amend-
ment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321, 375-79 (1979).
360. Just as the use of offensive and indecent language that offends the sensibilities of mi-
nors held captive in the public school classroom should not be protected by the First Amend-
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be unnecessary. If a student's exercise of First Amendment freedoms in
the classroom does in fact disrupt the educational process, it can be re-
stricted and punished as unprotected conduct.36' For example, students
can be punished for "making noise in class," even if the "noise" happens
to be a political speech delivered in an algebra class. In such an instance,
the speech wasted scarce class time, and therefore interfered with the
educational process. It would be a rare instance when speech in the
classroom, unrelated to the topic of discussion, could not be restricted
and punished as unprotected conduct.
A more difficult situation arises when verbal expression in the class-
room is germane to the subject matter under discussion, but nevertheless
is silenced. In such a case, it might be difficult for school officials to
demonstrate that the comments disrupted the educational process, unless
they can prove that the expression did nothing more than waste valuable
class time. According to this proposed model, it will be necessary to
determine whether the decision to silence the student proximately relates
to the inculcation of permissible societal values. If this inquiry does not
reveal that the decision to silence the student substantially furthered the
goal of value inculcation rather than indoctrination, a second, motiva-
tional, inquiry becomes necessary. Two examples illustrate this point.
In the first example, a student is silenced after advocating the notion
of white supremacy in a civics class devoted to a discussion of racial
equality and tolerance. In this instance, the speech of the student di-
rectly contradicts the constitutionally based value of racial equality.
Therefore, school officials should be permitted to silence this expression,
and no subsequent inquiry into the motivation underlying this decision is
necessary. Similarly, school officials should be permitted to silence stu-
dent speech in the classroom advocating views that contradict legally
based values, such as speech that espouses cheating, dishonesty, illegal
use of drugs, or sexual promiscuity.
In the second example, a student is silenced after advocating crea-
tionism in a biology class devoted to a discussion of evolution. 362 The
decision to silence this type of speech does not bear a close proximity to
the inculcation of permissible societal values, but it has the potential of
resulting in narrow religious indoctrination. The initial inquiry into the
proximity of the decision to legitimate societal values does not answer the
ment, see supra note 359, racist remarks should also remain unprotected in this restricted
environment. See Garvey, supra note 359, at 361-66.
361. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See
supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 350-57.
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question whether the decision was inculcative or indoctrinative. Thus,
an inquiry into motivation is required.
An inquiry into motivation may also be required where school offi-
cials suppress student expression in the classroom that is passive, takes
no class time, and does not disrupt the educational process. An example
would be a decision by school officials to require students to remove arm-
bands that symbolize a political belief.363 If this action is not disruptive,
it cannot be restricted as unprotected conduct. An examination of the
proximity of the decision to suppress the speech to the inculcation of
legitimate societal values reveals that there is no close proximity. There-
fore, an inquiry into the motivation underlying the decision must be
made. If the purpose is to suppress the expression of a political view-
point opposed by school officials, the decision could not stand. 4
Another example would be a situation where a high school French
teacher displays travel posters of France in the classroom but denies a
student request to display travel posters of Spain or political posters in
the classroom. The display of the additional posters would not disrupt
the educational process, and therefore cannot be disallowed on the
grounds that it is unprotected conduct. Additionally, the decision to
suppress the expression does not further the inculcation of legitimate so-
cietal values. Hence, an inquiry into the motivation of the teacher is re-
quired. In this case, the teacher undoubtedly will argue that the display
of travel posters of France aids the educational goal of heightening stu-
dent interest in France and the French language, and that the display of
other posters would detract from that goal. A decision based upon this
motivation is consistent with the function of public education to transmit
knowledge, and should be upheld as having been made for sound peda-
gogical reasons and not for the purpose of suppressing disfavored ideas.
2. Motivational Inquiry in Operation
In Pico, both Justices Brennan and Blackmun suggested the nature
of the inquiry to be made by courts in examining the motivation underly-
ing decisions of school officials.36 5 Two factors must be examined: the
substantive criteria devised by school officials used in making decisions,
and the regularity of the procedures used to arrive at the particular deci-
sion being challenged.
The Island Trees school board appointed a Book Review Committee
to recommend which of the questioned books should be retained or re-
363. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See supra text accompanying notes 49-64.
364. 393 U.S. at 509-11.
365. 457 U.S. at 872-75 (plurality opinion); id. at 879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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moved.366 In its charge to the committee, the school board directed the
committee to consider several factors: "educational suitability," "good
taste, .... relevance," and "appropriateness to age and grade level." '3 67
None of the Justices in Pico manifested any disagreement with those cri-
teria. Justice Blackmun noted several factors that could be used in a
book removal decision: "School officials must be able to choose one book
over another . . . when the first book is deemed more relevant to the
curriculum, or better written, or when one of a host of other politically
neutral reasons is present." '368 He added that school boards could "re-
fuse to make a book available to students because it contains offensive
language,. . . or because it is psychologically or intellectually inappro-
priate for the age group, or even, perhaps, because the ideas it advances
are 'manifestly inimical to the public welfare.' "369 Finally, Justice
Blackmun stated that "school officials may choose one book over another
because they believe that one subject is more important, or is more de-
serving of emphasis."'370
Such standards tacitly recognize the appropriateness of the inculca-
tive function of public education. Of all the terms used, perhaps "educa-
tional suitability" is the most comprehensive standard. "Appro-
priateness to age and grade level," "relevance to the curriculum," "better
written," and "psychologically or intellectually inappropriate" are sub-
sumed within the more general standard of "educational suitability."
The term "educational suitability" is ambiguous and capable of dif-
ferent constructions. It is not, however, "standardless" or "highly sub-
jective" as the dissenting opinions in Pico assert.3 71 The more specific
terms described above clarify this ambiguous standard and give it precise
meaning. By construing the standard with due regard for the inculcative
function of public education, and by giving maximum deference to the
decisions of school officials as to the values to be instilled, a clearly un-
derstood standard results. If the school board action is undertaken with
a view to students' physical, psychological, and mental well-being, and if
reasonable persons can differ as to whether the challenged action will
promote that well-being, then the educational suitability standard has
366. Id. at 857 (plurality opinion).
367. Id.
368. Id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
369. Id. (partially quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)). See supra
text accompanying notes 9-10.
370. 457 U.S. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
371. Id. at 890 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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been met.372 On the other hand, if the challenged action was taken to
impose narrow political, partisan, or religious views upon students with a
corresponding refusal to permit students to have access to competing
views, then the challenged action must be invalidated.
In addition to examining the substantive criteria upon which the
challenged school board action was based, an inquiry into the motivation
underlying that action must include an examination of the regularity of
the procedures used to arrive at that decision. In his opinion for the
court of appeals in Pico, Judge Sifton made this inquiry. 73 After noting
that the Island Trees Board of Education had rejected the recommenda-
tions of its Book Review Committee, and that the committee had fol-
lowed board-established substantive criteria which focused on the
standard of educational suitability, Judge Sifton characterized that board
action as "an unusual and irregular intervention in the school libraries'
operations by persons not routinely concerned with such matters. 374
Justice Brennan made the same point: "This would be a very different
case if the record demonstrated that [the school board] had employed
established, regular, and facially unbiased procedures for the review of
controversial materials. 3 75 He further noted that the complaining stu-
dents had alleged that, in making its decision, the school board had "ig-
nored 'the advice of literary experts,' the views of 'librarians and teachers
within the. . system,' the advice of the Superintendent of Schools, and
the guidance of publications that rate books for junior and senior high
school students., 376 Finally, after rejecting decisions arrived at through
established channels, the board "resorted to the extraordinary procedure
of appointing a Book Review Committee-the advice of which was later
rejected without explanation., 37 7 Justice Brennan concluded that the
school board's "removal procedures were highly irregular and ad hoc-
the antithesis of those procedures that might tend to allay suspicions re-
garding [the board's] motivations. 3 7 8
An examination of the procedures used to reach the challenged deci-
sion is not unusual in judicial inquiries into the motivation of govern-
mental decisionmakers. It is common in cases involving Equal
372. This inquiry is an application of the traditional "rational nexus" standard of judicial
review discussed supra note 307 and accompanying text.
373. Pico, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980) (plurality opinion).
374. Id. at 414.
375. 457 U.S. at 874 (plurality opinion).
376. Id.
377. Id. at 875.
378. Id.
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Protection Clause3 79 challenges to governmental action that appears ra-
cially neutral on its face but has a racially disproportionate impact.38° In
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 381 the Supreme Court noted several procedural factors that may
be examined in an effort to ascertain the motivation behind the govern-
mental agency's decision:
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes. . . . The specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on the deci-
sionmaker's purposes. . . . Departures from the normal proce-
dural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes
are playing a role. Substantive departures too may be relevant,
particularly if the factors usually considered important by the deci-
sionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.
The legislative or administrative history may be highly rele-
vant, especially where there are contemporary statements by mem-
bers of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or
reports. In some extraordinary instances the members might be
called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the
official action, although even then such testimony frequently will
be barred by privilege.
3 s2
379. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in pertinent part: "No state shall. . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
380. Several Supreme Court cases have noted that a law that is racially neutral on its face
and serves ends "within the power of government to pursue," does not deny equal protection
of the laws "simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another."
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (upholding a requirement that applicants for
the Washington, D.C. Police Department pass an objective written test of verbal skills, in spite
of evidence that the failure rate of blacks was significantly higher than the failure rate of
whites). Disproportionate impact is relevant, but must be coupled with "[p]roof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose" to show a denial of equal protection. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (upholding a municipal-
ity's refusal to rezone a 15-acre parcel of land from single family to multiple family classifica-
tion, in spite of the argument that excluding low and moderate income tenants had a
disproportionate effect on persons who were both poor and black). Similarly, school desegre-
gation cases have held that the mere fact of racial imbalance in schools in a school district is
not in itself violative of the Equal Protection Clause. "[T]he differentiating factor between de
jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ...is purpose or intent to segregate."
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (emphasis original). It is also significant
that the Supreme Court will inquire into the purpose of governmental actions that are chal-
lenged as violating the First Amendment Establishment Clause, supra note 326. See, e.g.,
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
381. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
382. Id. at 267-68. Although the Supreme Court in Pico did not refer to these procedural
factors, Judge Sifton not only referred to them but quoted them at length. See Pico, 638 F.2d
at 417 (plurality opinion).
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In applying these procedural factors to the facts alleged by the stu-
dents in Pico, it is clear that the trial court could have found ample evi-
dence of unconstitutionally motivated action. Presumably the normal
procedural sequence of events w6uld be for a school district's profes-
sional staff, including teachers and librarians, to make decisions involv-
ing the acquisition and removal of books. However, the Island Trees
Board of Education apparently ignored the professional judgment of
these educators.383 Similarly, after appointing a Book Review Commit-
tee and providing it with facially unbiased criteria to use in making its
recommendations, the school board rejected those recommendations
without explanation. 384  Finally, the students alleged that the board
members made statements tending to prove that the removal decisions
were based on "their social, political and moral tastes. ' 385 Had the stu-
dents been able to prove these allegations, then a prima facie case of un-
constitutional motivation would have existed. This prima facie case
would have shifted the burden to the school board to demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the same decision would have been
reached even in the absence of this impermissible motivation.386
A similar type of motivational inquiry can be used to review deci-
sions of school officials concerning classroom activities. The reviewing
court should first examine the substantive criteria promulgated by school
officials. In response to challenges to curricular and instructional deci-
sions, school officials can present evidence of their overall curriculum
and instructional model, established criteria for textbook selection, and
policies concerning both teaching methodology and the values to be in-
stilled in students.387 Such criteria includes factors like educational suit-
383. 457 U.S. at 874 (plurality opinion).
384. Id. at 875.
385. Id. at 858-59.
386. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). The
Mt. Healthy rule regarding mixed motivation was expressly adopted by the plurality opinion in
Pico. Justice Brennan stated that if the intent to deny students access to ideas with which the
school officials disagreed was a "decisive factor" in the decision to remove books from the
school library, then the decision violated the First Amendment. 457 U.S. at 871. Justice Bren-
nan added that "[b]y 'decisive factor' we mean a 'substantial factor' in the absence of which the
opposite decision would have been reached." Id. at 871 n.22 (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at
287). For example, if school board actions concerning curricular or instructional matters are
based upon both a permissible motivation to inculcate students in societal values and an imper-
missible motivation to suppress ideas objected to on narrow political, partisan, or religious
grounds, the removal decision would stand if the school officials can prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the decision would have occurred even in the absence of the impermissible
motivation.
387. Nothing in the Constitution would prevent school officials from adopting variable
standards based on the age and grade level of students. Some subjects that might be appropri-
ate for high school students would not only be inappropriate but also psychologically damag-
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ability, appropriateness to age and grade level, relevance to the
established curriculum, and psychological and intellectual appropriate-
ness.388 In challenges to actions of school officials that silence a student's
speech in the classroom, the school officials can present evidence of rules
and policies governing classroom deportment, teacher authority, and stu-
dent discipline.389 Such criteria should be clear, nonambiguous, and nar-
rowly tailored to serve the school's interests in preventing disruption of
the educational process and in serving the inculcative function of that
process.
After examining the substantive criteria, the court should examine
the regularity of the procedures used to arrive at the challenged decision,
measuring the procedures actually used against the factors detailed in
Arlington Heights.39 In challenges to curricular and instructional deci-
sions, the court should examine evidence of the types of procedural irreg-
ularities alleged in Pico.3 9 ' In challenges to the actions of school officials
which silence a student's speech in the classroom, 392 the court should
inquire into the fairness, impartiality, and consistency of the procedure.
This inquiry might seek evidence that school officials have departed sub-
stantially from principles typically associated with procedural due
process.393
ing to younger children. For example, sex education as it is taught to teenagers is quite
different from that taught to students in the primary grades. See, e.g., Trachtman v. Anker,
426 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd in part, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 925 (1978). See also supra note 156. Furthermore, public elementary and secondary
school students are minors. The younger the child, the less likely it is that the child possesses
the intellectual and emotional maturity to make rational and independent decisions. As Jus-
tice Stewart noted in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring), the capacity for free choice is the basic presupposition of the First Amendment. Finally,
the child's degree of "captivity" in the inherently coercive environment of the public school
classroom may well depend on his or her emotional and intellectual maturity. For all of these
reasons, common sense dictates that students at different levels of physical, emotional, and
intellectual development be treated differently.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 367-70.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 363-64 for a hypothetical example. There is no
constitutional reason why these types of school rules and policies cannot contain variable stan-
dards. See supra note 387. For example, codes of student conduct may permit high school
students, but not elementary school students, to write and publish a student newspaper; to
have freedom of mobility within the school building; or to be permitted to leave school early
when the day's school work is completed. Conversely, certain types of misconduct, such as
cheating or plagiarism, might be treated as a more serious offense when committed by a high
school student than when committed by an elementary school student.
390. See supra text accompanying note 382.
391. 457 U.S. at 874-75 (plurality opinion). See supra text accompanying notes 374-78.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 363-64 for a hypothetical example.
393. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) held that on the basis of state law, public school
students have "legitimate claims of entitlement to a public education," which are property
interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 573.
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Drawing analogies from criminal law and procedure, the reviewing
court might also permit the introduction of evidence suggesting the retro-
active application of a rule or policy;394 evidence comparing the punish-
ment imposed on the complaining student with punishments imposed on
similarly-situated students; 395 evidence suggesting that the punishment
was disproportionate to the misconduct of the student;396 and evidence of
the decisionmaker's bias against or dislike of the student.397 Such facts,
if alleged and proved, would indicate that the silencing and subsequent
punishment of the student was motivated by a desire to punish the stu-
dent for his objectionable ideas and beliefs, and not by a concern for the
efficient functioning of the educational process.398
A judicial inquiry into motivation probably would result in the ex-
amination of both the substantive criteria upon which the challenged ac-
Therefore, a suspension from public school necessitates both notice and a hearing. The Court
held that with short suspensions of 10 days or less, the "process" that is "due" consists only of
"effective notice and informal hearing permitting the student to give his version of the events"
to the disciplinarian. Id. at 583. The Court suggested, however, that longer suspensions or
expulsions may require more formal procedures, such as the right to retain counsel, to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses, and to call the student's own witnesses. Id. at 583-84.
394. In a proceeding to punish a student for misconduct, retroactivity does suggest proce-
dural irregularity. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 474-77 (1978). The Ex
Post Facto Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, apply only
to attempts to enact criminal or penal measures that have a retroactive effect. Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 397 (1798). Although disciplining a public school student is not crimi-
nal in nature, see Ingraham V. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), general retrospective legislation
may violate due process. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
395. Although such a comparison is not constitutionally mandated even in capital or other
criminal cases, Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984), the imposition of widely divergent
penalties on students who have committed the same or similar offenses is an indication of
procedural irregularity.
396. The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, has been
held to prohibit criminal sentences that are significantly disproportionate to the offense com-
mitted. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), struck down a life sentence with no possibility of
parole imposed on a defendant convicted of uttering a "no account" check for $100. The
defendant, who had six prior felony convictions, all for nonviolent offenses, was sentenced as a
recidivist.
397. An impartial jury in criminal cases is required by the Sixth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Similarly, due process requires an impartial judge in criminal proceedings. Ward
v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). The requirement of an impartial decisionmaker
has been applied to civil proceedings as a matter of procedural due process. E.g., Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). In short suspensions from public schools for 10 days or less,
the decisionmaker himself can be a witness of the conduct that forms the basis for the charge.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
398. The establishment of a prima facie case of unconstitutional motivation will shift to the
school board the burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the same
decision would have been reached even in the absence of the impermissible motivation. Mt.
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). See supra note 386
and accompanying text.
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tion was based and the procedural regularity surrounding the decision.
By being sensitive to the possibility of such an inquiry, school boards and
administrators can take steps to insure that they do not act out of im-
proper motives or give such an appearance. They should take care to
adopt facially unbiased, nonambiguous substantive criteria and follow
procedures that are tailored to serve articulated and legitimate educa-
tional functions. These preventive measures will protect school officials
from unwelcome litigation and fully serve the principles of the First
Amendment.
Conclusion
The tradition of value inculcation in public education and the desire
of students to have access to ideas and beliefs ideally should complement
each other and not be in conflict. Responsible and sensitive school
boards, administrators, and teachers should recognize and attempt to at-
tain this ideal by permitting various ideas and views to be heard within
the context of the prescribed curriculum and the necessity for value in-
culcation. Where the interested parties are unable to reconcile their con-
flicting views, however, a resolution of the dispute must rest on a
determination of the constitutional interests of the respective parties.
This Article has canvassed Supreme Court cases that have ad-
dressed the constitutional issues involved and has concluded that the
First Amendment rights of public school students in the classroom are
extremely limited. The Supreme Court consistently has affirmed the le-
gitimacy and appropriateness of the inculcative function of public educa-
tion, and has recognized that a doctrine of wide-ranging First
Amendment rights in the public school classroom would contradict and
ultimately defeat that function.
At the same time, this Article recognizes that public school class-
rooms are not wholly immune from First Amendment limitations. In
particular, school officials are not permitted to indoctrinate students in
narrow political, partisan, or religious views. Courts therefore must oc-
casionally intervene to prevent such indoctrination. By making a twin
inquiry into the content of the information being taught and the constitu-
tional, legal, or other basis of the values being instilled, courts ordinarily
will be able to determine if the challenged practice constitutes permissi-
ble value inculcation or impermissible indoctrination. In close cases, it
will be necessary to make a further inquiry into the motivation underly-
ing the challenged action.
Courts should proceed with extreme caution in reviewing decisions
of school officials. School boards, while not possessing educational ex-
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pertise, are democratically accountable and should be presumed to reflect
the values, goals, and aspirations of the community. Teachers and
school administrators, while not democratically accountable, possess the
educational expertise to make decisions and recommendations based on
valid educational and pedagogical goals. Courts, which are neither dem-
ocratically accountable nor possessed with educational expertise, should
pay extreme deference to decisions of school officials, and intervene only
in rare instances.
School officials do not appreciate judicial intervention into class-
room activities, but by being aware of the possibility, they can become
sensitive to the underlying constitutional ramifications of their proposed
actions. School officials, while they should reflect valid community con-
cerns, have the constitutional duty to make decisions based upon valid
financial and educational considerations and not on the basis of narrow
political, partisan, or religious views. To insure that appropriate educa-
tional concerns are being addressed, school boards should rely heavily on
the expert advice of their professional educators when curricular and in-
structional decisions are made. If school officials act with caution, delib-
eration, and sensitivity, their decisions rarely will be successfully
challenged. At the same time, the First Amendment interests of all par-
ties will be fully protected.
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